United Nations S/2018/700

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 12 July 2018 from the Permanent Representatives of Germany and Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

We have the honour to write you on behalf of Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and our own countries, Germany and Turkey.

We are deeply worried by the possible grave ramifications of Law No. 10 enacted by the Syrian regime on 2 April 2018. The law ostensibly seeks to redevelop damaged and informal settlements in urban areas but, if implemented, threatens to expropriate the private property of millions of displaced Syrians, depriving them of their homes and land. As a consequence, this law would significantly hinder their return home.

Under Law No. 10, once an area is designated for urban redevelopment, individuals must establish their ownership or occupancy rights within a 30-day notification period to secure their right to compensation. According to unconfirmed reports, this period has been extended to one year. Property unclaimed by owners will then be expropriated by Damascus without compensation.

It is obvious that, in addition to not having physical access to Syria owing to displacement, the lack or loss of documentation for housing, land and property will prevent many Syrians from claiming ownership, resulting in the uncompensated expropriation of their property. This, in turn, will have significant repercussions for the future return of millions of Syrian internally displaced persons and refugees.

Law No. 10 is not a singular piece of legislation and should not be viewed in isolation. It is only 1 of over 40 related laws on housing, land and property adopted since the beginning of the Syrian conflict and part of a comprehensive policy to alter the sectarian, social, economic and political landscape of Syria and the fabric of local communities.

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Damascus has systematically destroyed the land registry and cadastre records in opposition strongholds and in areas where it has regained control. Such practices are well documented by international human rights organizations. In July 2013, the regime bombarded the building in Homs where land registry and cadastre records were kept. Similar incidents have been observed in Zabadani, Darayya and Qusayr. Following the destruction of records, the

Please recycle

regime first forcefully displaced the local civilian population and then placed groups close to Damascus in those buildings. Among these groups are a number of militias from third countries.

Grievances related to housing, land and property rights in Syria predate the conflict and are widely viewed as one of the contributing factors to the social unrest and protests in 2011. The recent housing, land and property legislation, especially Law No. 10, has further exacerbated these grievances. The locations currently being discussed as potential zones for the implementation of Law No. 10 include areas where Damascus has reasserted control through military escalation following large-scale forced evacuations and flight. This gives rise to well-founded concerns that civilians from areas formerly controlled by the opposition will face dispossession and thus collective punishment.

In the absence of a stable security situation and an inclusive political environment that allows displaced Syrians to establish their ownership or occupancy rights and safely return to their homes, implementing such a law will lead to the arbitrary confiscation of property and denies the individual property rights of millions of Syrians, rights that are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement equally reaffirm that property and possessions left behind by internally displaced persons should be protected against destruction and arbitrary and illegal appropriation, occupation or use (Principle 21).

Furthermore, Law No. 10 is by its design likely to de facto negatively affect in particular those Syrians who left or were forced to leave the country or their home region because of their political beliefs or security concerns. The law may therefore be incompatible with the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of political opinion in article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Syria is a party.

Law No. 10 clearly contradicts and grossly undermines the United Nations-led efforts to find a political solution, jeopardizes future reconciliation and flagrantly defies Security Council resolution 2254 (2015), in which the Council underscored the critical need to build conditions for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their home areas and the rehabilitation of affected areas, in accordance with international law, including applicable provisions of the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and, taking into account the interests of those countries hosting refugees, urged Member States to provide assistance in this regard.

The law has already stoked great uncertainty and anxiety among many Syrians inside and outside Syria, including in Member States that are hosting large numbers of Syrians. We urge you, in close consultation with Member States, to oppose the implementation of the law in its original form, call for its substantive amendment, safeguard the rights of the millions of Syrians who are affected and identify measures to ensure that the above-mentioned implications for all Syrians can be averted.

The United Nations and all its agencies in their dealings with Damascus should adopt a coherent and unified approach to ensure respect for international human rights obligations regarding housing, land and property rights. The adoption of laws that contravene those rights must be challenged.

Above all, the rights of all Syrians, including those displaced by the conflict, must be addressed and protected within the framework of the United Nations-led political process in line with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). We call upon you to make every necessary effort, including within the United Nations system itself, to protect and advocate the rights and future of millions of Syrians.

We would appreciate it if the present letter could be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Christoph **Heusgen**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the
Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations

(*Signed*) Feridun H. **Sinirlioğlu**
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Turkey to the United Nations

United Nations S/2018/701

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 July 2018
English
Original: French

Letter dated 12 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter from the Union of Medical Assistance and Care Organizations dated 11 July 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) François **Delattre**

18-11969 (E) 190718 190718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 12 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: English]

We write to you with great urgency concerning the dangerous situation in southern Syria and the uncertain fate of civilians seeking safety and protection in Dar'a and Qunaytirah. Despite the recent signing of a "reconciliation" deal to end the weeks of aerial bombardment in southern Syria, independent humanitarian aid agencies continue to struggle to meet the growing demands of civilians displaced and residents in urgent need of food, water, shelter and health care. We are gravely concerned for the safety and security of those who are making the difficult journey back home in the absence of any guarantees for their protection, as well as the many medical personnel who selflessly chose to remain on the ground during the intense bombardment and are now seeking urgent evacuation.

The recent military campaign in southern Syria heavily damaged civilian infrastructure, putting many medical facilities out of service. In the past week, three of our humanitarian workers in the Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations have been killed. Now, in the aftermath of the reconciliation agreement, many of our colleagues in Dar'a and Qunaytirah are requesting urgent and safe evacuations. At present, at least 26 doctors and 30 Union staff are seeking immediate evacuation, along with their family members. With no guarantees for their safety, they fear for their lives and the lives of their loved ones if they remain.

We must be clear that the death, destruction and suffering in Dar'a and across Syria were and remain entirely preventable. We understand the challenges on the ground and the difficult policy options with which you are faced, but the option of "do nothing" has drastic consequences for civilian lives and medical relief workers in particular, as is now evident in southern Syria. As a minimum, we urge the Security Council, collectively or as individual Member States, to call on Russia and the Syrian authorities to immediately halt the violence and allow humanitarian aid workers free and unfettered access throughout southern Syria, and we call for urgent measures to evacuate our colleagues who wish to leave. We also urge all parties to guarantee the protection of civilians who seek to return to their homes.

In parallel to your political tools, we ask the members of the Security Council to intensify their emergency aid response to groups on the ground providing life-saving support. As humanitarians, it is our duty to do whatever we can to bring to your attention the urgent needs on the ground and to urge the members of the Council to take the steps that will save lives.

Dr. Ghanem **Tayara**
Chair, Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations

Dr. Tawfik **Chamaa**
General Secretary, Union of Medical Care and Relief Organizations

United Nations S/2018/702

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 July 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 13 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

Last night, aircraft of th so-called international coalition led by the United States of America committed yet another crime when they deliberately targeted innocent Syrian civilians, the majority of whom were women and children. At midnight Damascus time on 13 July, warplanes of that illegitimate coalition struck civilian homes in rural areas of Albu Kamal, Dayr al-Zawr governorate, and perpetrated a massacre in which dozens of innocent civilians were killed or wounded. The air strikes also caused massive destruction to many homes, private property and infrastructure in that area.

Those criminal air strikes that were carried out by the illegitimate "international coalition" targeted the villages of Baghuz Fawqani and Susah, which are situated on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in rural areas of Albu Kamal. Documented information ndicates that, to date, 30 civilians have died and dozens of others have been injured, mostly women and children. Medical and community sources have indicated that the number of dead and wounded is likely to rise, because many of the victims are in a critical condition and because the savage, intense and incessant bombardment of those villages by American warplanes has made it difficult to remove victims from under the rubble and evacuate them. As I stated above, that savage act of aggression has caused tremendous destruction to homes, public and private property, and infrastructure in those villages, where homes have collapsed atop their inhabitants.

The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its long-standing legal and political position that the "international coalition" is illegitimate and violates the sovereignty and the territorial unity and integrity of Syria, and thereby contravenes the provisions of the Charter and the relevant Security Council resolutions. My country's Government rejects any justification or excuse offered for the aggression that was perpetrated by the illegitimate "international coalition" and underscores that the leadership of that illegitimate coalition understands the demographic and geographical distribution of that area and is aware that it is populated. The leadership of that coalition also understands that the purpose of such brutal air raids is to put pressure on and take revenge against the people of that area, because they refused to allow the militias of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces to enter their villages. The United States is

seeking to consolidate its presence and further its ambitions in those areas and throughout Syria.

My Government has directed scores of letters to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council from the moment that this illegitimate coalition, which operates without a mandate from Security Council and outside its control, was established in 2014. Those letters contained substantiated information regarding the crimes that the coalition has committed in Syria. To date, those crimes have killed hundreds of innocent Syrian civilians and injured tens of thousands of others, some of whom have been permanently maimed, and destroyed Syrian public and private property and infrastructure along the Euphrates River, particularly bridges, schools, hospitals, water pumping stations and the electrical power plants and transformers.

Raqqah city exemplifies the savagery and criminality of the United States of America and the other States that make up the illegitimate "international coalition", which, instead of combating terrorism in Syria, as it has claimed, has broken every taboo and has even attacked Syrian Arab Army forces several times, in order to break the blockade imposed on the terrorists of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) organization. Moreover, that illegitimate coalition and the terrorist militias of the Syrian Democratic Forces have concluded dubious and dirty deals with ISIL, which has been designated a terrorist entity, in order to evacuate the latter's terrorist fighters, along with their families and weapons, and have them fight the Syrian army in Dayr al-Zawr governorate and elsewhere.

The continued failure of the Security Council and the Secretariat to address the crimes that are being perpetrated by the illegitimate "international coalition" is regrettable and surprising, and arouses suspicions, particularly given that certain Security Council members continue to defend and promote the terrorist organizations that are attacking the Syrian people and the territorial unity of Syria. Those members are also ignoring the massacres that are being perpetrated by the illegitimate international coalition in Dayr al-Zawr, Aleppo, Raqqah and Hasakah before the entire world, under the pretext of combating ISIL. The coalition has destroyed every oil well in that region of Syria, in order to prevent those facilities from returning to operation and becoming capable of resuming production and supporting the economy of the Syrian Arab Republic, which has been greatly harmed by terrorism, the crimes of the illegitimate international coalition and the unilateral coercive economic measures imposed by the United States of America, the European Union and other States.

The Syrian Arab Republic once again calls upon the Governments of the States that form this illegitimate coalition to show a sense of legal, moral and humanitarian responsibility and withdraw from this sinister enterprise. They must not allow the United States, the United Kingdom and France to continue to mislead the international community about the coalition's true and hostile purpose, which is to control and dominate the peoples and countries of the world and impose the rule of force. My country reaffirms that, ultimately, history and the world's conscience will record and document the crimes committed by the coalition.

My country's Government calls upon the relevant United Nations organs to fulfil their duty and responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and to do so in a fair, impartial and professional manner. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that it, along with its allies and friends that are dedicated to the rule of law and legality and are striving assiduously to establish security, stability and peace in the world, will continue to make every effort to arrive at a lasting, peaceful solution to the situation in Syria through the conclusion of national reconciliation agreements and by regularizing the status of Syrians who have been misled about the true nature of what is happening in the country. The Syrian State and its allies will continue to fight armed

terrorist groups regardless of where they are, in keeping with its national and constitutional duties and its responsibilities under international law to protect its citizens and maintain the country's territorial unity and integrity. By doing so, Syria is protecting the other peoples of the world from terrorist crimes and the threat of terrorism.

I should be grateful if these identical letters could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/703

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2018

Original: English

Seventy-third year

Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

Report of the Secretary-General

Reporting period from 1 March 2018 to 20 June 2018

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since my report on 8 March 2018 (S/2018/210), including on the specific provisions of Security Council resolution 2373 (2017). During the reporting period, there was no progress with regard to the outstanding obligations of the parties under resolution 1701 (2006) or towards a permanent ceasefire. The situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained generally calm.

II. Implementation of resolution 1701 (2006)

A. Situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

2. Despite the continued relative calm along the Blue Line and in the area of operations and the reaffirmed commitment by the Israeli and Lebanese authorities to resolution 1701 (2006), several developments heightened tensions. The UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and my Acting Special Coordinator for Lebanon maintained permanent liaison with both parties to de-escalate tensions and continued to urge them to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric or any action threatening the cessation of hostilities and to utilize established channels to address concerns.

3. As in other parts of Lebanon, the UNIFIL area of operations was calm throughout the electoral period, including on Election Day on 6 May. The Lebanese Armed Forces and other security institutions increased their presence during the election period in the UNIFIL area of operations. At the request of UNIFIL, the Israel Defense Forces suspended construction works south of the Blue Line on 6 May. Celebratory shooting was heard in Tyre (Sector West) when preliminary election results were released.

Please recycle

4. UNIFIL continued to monitor the construction works by the Israel Defense Forces south of the Blue Line, which started in January and led to tense situations on several occasions. On 8 April, as the works started east of the Blue Line close to the Kafr Kila Udaysah road (Sector East), a protester aimed what appeared to be a pistol towards UNIFIL. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces, which dispersed the protesters. On 12 April, in Kafr Kila, a sound from the backfire of a vehicle that was mistaken for a gunshot prompted the Israel Defense Forces to deploy to the location with rocket launchers, while the Lebanese Armed Forces took up positions with heavy machine guns. UNIFIL, through its liaison branch, de-escalated the situation.

5. UNIFIL observed in four separate instances weapons pointed by the Israel Defense Forces towards the north, including two incidents in which Israeli soldiers pointed their weapons towards Observer Group Lebanon and UNIFIL troops. On 31 March, UNIFIL observed Lebanese Armed Forces and Israel Defense Forces personnel pointing their weapons at each other near Udaysah. UNIFIL personnel intervened to defuse the situation.

6. On 10 May, the Israel Defense Forces alerted UNIFIL of potential spillover into the Shab'a area (Sector East) from kinetic activity on the Golan, outside the UNIFIL area of operations, and advised UNIFIL troops in the area to take protective measures. UNIFIL heard 41 explosions and observed 21 traces of rockets being fired south of Kfar Shuba (Sector East). Later that day, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that they had found and removed debris from an air defence missile in Habbariyah close to Shab'a. UNIFIL increased its counter-rocket-launching operations in the area.

7. The Lebanese Armed Forces and other security institutions successfully maintained calm during peaceful public gatherings throughout Lebanon during Palestinian Land Day on 30 March, the inauguration of the United States Embassy in Jerusalem on 14 May, Nakbah Day on 15 May and al-Quds Day on 8 June, when more than 1,000 people gathered in Marun al-Ra's (Sector West). The situation in the UNIFIL area of operations remained calm.

8. In reference to the visit of an Iranian official to the UNIFIL area of operations on 28 January cited in my last report (S/2018/210), the Lebanese Minister of Defense, in a letter dated 13 April addressed to the President of the Security Council, stated that the Iranian official was accompanied by a member of the Lebanese Parliament, and that "his escort was not visibly carrying weapons".

9. From 1 March to 19 June, UNIFIL recorded 475 Blue Line ground violations, including 347 violations by shepherds, predominantly in the Shab'a Farms area, and by farmers cultivating their fields, mainly near Rumaysh, and 127 violations involving civilians and 1 violation by an unarmed Lebanese Armed Forces soldier accessing the Shu'ayb well near Blida (Sector East).

10. On six occasions, UNIFIL observed firing in the air by the Israel Defense Forces, apparently to deter civilians, mainly shepherds, from crossing the Blue Line, in the Shab'a area. On 2 May, the Israel Defense Forces fired two smoke grenades close to seven individuals crossing the Blue Line in Kafr Kila. The Israel Defense Forces apprehended a woman and a shepherd crossing south of the Blue Line on 28 March and 2 May, respectively. Both individuals were returned within 24 hours in the presence of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces. UNIFIL is investigating the incidents. UNIFIL repeatedly urged the Israel Defense Forces to refrain from using live ammunition when firing warning shots and repeatedly urged the Lebanese Armed Forces to prevent Blue Line violations by civilians.

11. Israel continued to violate Lebanese airspace almost daily, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and Lebanese sovereignty. From 1 March to 19 June, UNIFIL

recorded 456 air violations, totalling 1,518 overflight hours. Unmanned aerial vehicles accounted for 368 (80.7 per cent) of these violations, with the remaining violations involving fighter jets or unidentified aircraft. UNIFIL protested all air violations to the Israel Defense Forces and urged their immediate cessation.

12. Early on 31 March, UNIFIL detected an unmanned aerial vehicle entering Lebanese airspace from south of the Blue Line. Two hours later, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNIFIL that an Israeli unmanned aerial vehicle was missing in the UNIFIL area of operations near Bayt Yahun (Sector West). As the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL arrived at the crash site, UNIFIL observed the remains of a tactical reconnaissance drone and four Mikholit missiles with Hebrew markings. An explosive ordnance disposal team of the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted a controlled demolition of the four missiles.

13. The Israeli occupation of northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line continued, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006) and Lebanese sovereignty. Israel has not responded to the UNIFIL proposal submitted to both parties in 2011, aimed at facilitating the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the occupied area. The Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL in July 2011 of the agreement of Lebanon to the proposal.

14. The delineation of the maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon remains disputed. Lebanon protested the alleged violations of its sovereignty by Israeli vessels operating near the Israeli line of buoys. Lebanon maintains that the line of buoys, installed unilaterally by Israel, runs through its territorial waters, and does not recognize it. The United Nations does not recognize the line of buoys. Lebanon also alleged that Israel continues to violate its sovereignty by conducting electronic monitoring, espionage and surveillance through infrastructure deployed south of and along the Blue Line and devices placed on Lebanese territory.

15. Pursuant to resolution 1701 (2006), UNIFIL continued to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in establishing an area between the Blue Line and the Litani River free of unauthorized armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL. With an increasing focus on inspections, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces operated 8 permanent checkpoints daily and a daily average of 4 temporary checkpoints and 10 counter-rocket-launching operations across the area of operations, with the Lebanese Armed Forces spot-checking vehicles. UNIFIL stands ready to act independently within the full scope of its mandate and capabilities should there be credible evidence or information supporting the presence of unauthorized weapons or the imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from the area of operations. UNIFIL continued to monitor locations where the Israel Defense Forces alleged the presence of unauthorized weapons and infrastructure in the UNIFIL area of operations, but has not observed any violations of resolution 1701 (2006).

16. In the course of its activities, UNIFIL observed 190 instances of individuals carrying unauthorized arms in violation of resolution 1701 (2006), 189 of which involved hunting weapons, mostly in the areas of Yarun (Sector West), Bastrah, Blida, Mays al-Jabal and Sarda (all Sector East), in the vicinity of the Blue Line. The other incident occurred on 9 May, when UNIFIL, patrolling in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, observed an individual in camouflage with an automatic rifle in a vehicle near Adshit al Qusayr (Sector East). UNIFIL alerted the Lebanese Armed Forces in all instances, including in a letter to the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces South Litani Sector, and requested that appropriate measures be taken (see para. 35 below).

17. Pursuant to paragraph 15 of resolution 2373 (2017), UNIFIL further increased its visible presence and activities, with a focus on preserving the cessation of

hostilities. In monitoring the cessation of hostilities, UNIFIL sustained its operational tempo as well as non-operational activities to mitigate risks in a timely manner, thereby preventing small incidents from escalating into larger-scale violence. The number of UNIFIL monthly operational activities has increased from 13,362 in August 2017 to 14,871 in May 2018, with a 68 per cent increase in foot patrols and a 28 per cent increase in the average flight hours of reconnaissance air patrols. More than a third of all activities were conducted at night.

18. From 1 March to 19 June, UNIFIL conducted 53,285 military operational activities, including 25,174 patrols. UNIFIL increased its static operational activities, with 120 permanent and temporary observation posts in May, up from 73 in February. UNIFIL continued its intensified foot patrols in urban areas where narrow roadways and community concerns do not allow for the use of heavy vehicles. UNIFIL increased the number of foot patrols along the Blue Line from 1,767 in January to 1,909 in May. UNIFIL's vehicular, foot and air patrols covered all municipalities and villages in the area of operations. UNIFIL maintained close contact with the Lebanese Armed Forces and community leaders in southern Lebanon in order to address any sensitivities without compromising mandated tasks.

19. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL was generally respected, except for those occasions detailed in annex I. In some cases, members of local communities opposed the use of heavy military vehicles on narrow roadways in populated areas.

20. During the month of May, three UNIFIL patrols and four patrols of Observer Group Lebanon were stopped by individuals wearing green uniform-like attire at the gates of a facility operated by the Lebanese non-governmental organization "Green Without Borders" in the vicinity of Aytarun (Sector West) near the Blue Line. The men claimed that UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon could only enter if accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL informed the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Joseph Aoun, that it was imperative for UNIFIL, including Observer Group Lebanon, to independently access and patrol all areas within its area of operations without hindrance. Following a joint visit on 19 June, the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and the South Litani Sector Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces agreed to resume patrols in close coordination along the road.

21. Among the seven identified "Green Without Borders" locations in the area of operations, all close to the Blue Line, UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon are able to visit the second site in Aytarun almost daily. The sites in Ayta al-Sha'b and Marwahin and the two sites in Labbunah, all in Sector West, as well as the site in Udaysah in Sector East, are purportedly located on private property. UNIFIL is following up with the Lebanese Armed Forces regarding access to these areas. Meanwhile, UNIFIL conducts vehicular patrols along the surrounding roads and regular air reconnaissance of these areas.

22. Further enhancing the use of air assets, UNIFIL conducted on average 54.2 day and night reconnaissance flight hours per month, a 27 per cent increase compared to the last reporting period. Air reconnaissance patrols were concentrated over areas with limited access by UNIFIL ground patrols, such as private property, rugged terrain or terrain contaminated by explosive remnants of war or anti-personnel mines. Relations between UNIFIL and the local population remained largely positive. UNIFIL implemented quick-impact projects to address the pressing needs of local communities, to support the extension of State authority in the South and to contribute to force acceptance in line with the priorities identified during the strategic review of UNIFIL (see S/2017/202). A full update regarding the implementation of the recommendations of the 2017 strategic review is provided in annex II.

23. UNIFIL conducted 7,271 activities in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, including permanent and temporary checkpoints and counter-rocket-launching operations. UNIFIL conducted a daily average of 66 activities, in close coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces (19 per cent of all activities). Coordinated activities focused, in particular, on stepping up the number of foot patrols along the Blue Line, which increased from 15 in February to 236 in March.

24. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force carried out maritime interdiction operations on a 24-hour basis and capacity-building for the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy. From 1 March to 19 June, the Maritime Task Force hailed 2,535 vessels, 643 of which were inspected and cleared by the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese Navy maintains a current maritime picture of its waters through its eight coastal radar stations. UNIFIL conducted 198 training sessions to improve common operational standards for surveillance and hailing activities. This also included training for the participation of a Lebanese naval vessel in maritime operations for an uninterrupted period of 48 hours alongside UNIFIL vessels. In addition, the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force continues to play an important stabilizing role in controlling Lebanese territorial waters.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

25. UNIFIL hosted two regular tripartite meetings, on 22 March and 28 May, during which liaison, coordination and the violations of resolution 1701 (2006) were discussed. The liaison and coordination arrangements established with the parties enabled UNIFIL to de-escalate tensions over Israel Defense Forces construction works south of the Blue Line and ensure that no construction activity was carried out in locations that Lebanon considers "reservation" areas. UNIFIL also hosted six dedicated tripartite meetings on Blue Line issues, during which both parties expressed their commitment to finding practical solutions to contentious areas along the Blue Line.

26. In addition to the increased engagement in the tripartite meetings, the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL continued to liaise with the parties bilaterally to facilitate mutually acceptable solutions to contentious areas along the Blue Line, emphasizing that the visible marking of the Blue Line remains an important confidence-building activity. My Acting Special Coordinator reinforced these messages in her engagements with both sides.

27. The establishment of a UNIFIL liaison office in Tel Aviv, Israel, continued to be discussed with Israeli authorities. Their agreement to the UNIFIL proposal remains pending since 2008.

28. UNIFIL continued to train its personnel to ensure preparedness to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. UNIFIL organized on 17 April a joint exercise on emergency team deployment at Naqoura (Sector West), with the participation of 21 Lebanese civil defence officers from South Lebanon. On 19 April, UNIFIL met representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces, local municipal authorities and Lebanese civil defence governmental and non-governmental organizations to explore collaboration on civil defence and the protection of civilians, including through joint exercises with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

29. In accordance with the Security Council women, peace and security agenda and the policy on gender-responsive United Nations peacekeeping operations, UNIFIL continued to train military and civilian personnel on gender mainstreaming and conflict-related sexual violence.

C. Disarming armed groups

30. No progress was achieved with respect to the disarmament of armed groups. The maintenance of arms outside the control of the State by Hizbullah and other groups continues to restrict the ability of the Government of Lebanon to exercise full sovereignty and authority over its territory. Hizbullah continued to acknowledge publicly that it maintains a military capacity. On 26 March, Hizbullah Member of Parliament Nawaf Moussawi said that the "resistance" was "capable of striking deep into Israeli territory". On 21 April, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah warned that "the resistance now has the strength and capability and men and technology and expertise and experience and missiles that can strike any target in the enemy entity". On 15 May, he further warned that "a new phase" in the Syria conflict was opening and that "Israel proper could be the next target for retaliation".

31. On 1 April, Israel Defense Forces Chief of General Staff Gadi Eisenkot reportedly stated that the chances for war in 2018 were bigger than before, adding that, if war broke out, "everything under Hizbullah's use in Lebanon will be destroyed, from Beirut to the last point in the south". On 16 April, the Minister of Defense of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, reportedly said that the threat facing Israel's northern border now included the Lebanese Armed Forces. On 7 May, the Minister of Education of Israel, Naftali Bennett, said the Lebanese election results reaffirmed that "Lebanon equals Hizbullah" and that Israel would "view Lebanon as responsible for any action from within its territory".

32. The Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces continued counter-terrorism operations and arrests of individuals suspected of affiliation with or support for extremist groups. From 1 March to 20 June, 40 terrorism-related arrests were reported, including of suspected affiliates of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Jabhat Fath al-Sham (formerly Nusrah Front), in particular elements accused of involvement in the 2014 assaults on the Lebanese Army in Arsal and Tripoli.

33. On 20 March, armed men blocked a road in Baalbek to protest raids conducted by the Lebanese Armed Forces in the area. On 24 April, an alleged Hizbullah member reportedly died in the explosion of a rocket-propelled grenade in Sidon. On 15 May, two members of the Internal Security Forces were shot as they attempted to remove illegal structures in Baalbek; similar incidents were reported in Beirut's southern suburbs on 30 May. On 22 May, one Lebanese soldier was killed and eight injured in armed clashes in Tripoli. Several personal disputes escalated into shooting. On 17 June, two persons were killed and five injured in a family dispute in Baalbek. In the context of the parliamentary elections, there were several incidents involving gunfire; one person was killed on 6 May and one on 8 May.

34. On 15 March, as a first step towards the creation of a National Committee for Firearms, Prime Minister Hariri established a Human Security Unit under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers to raise awareness of the risks of firearms.

35. On 9 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces declared that individuals violating the nationwide ban on hunting from January to mid-September would be prosecuted. The Army noted that, as obligated under resolution 1701 (2006), it would take additional measures to ensure that the UNIFIL area of operations was free of weapons, including hunting weapons.

36. The security situation in Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon remained generally stable, with violent incidents and shootings most prevalent in the Ein El Helweh camp near Sidon. Four people were killed and 11 injured during clashes in March and April involving extremist groups and the Joint Palestinian Forces. In one

incident, armed elements entered two United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) schools. On 7 March, clashes between Fatah al-Intifada and the Sa'iqa, both pro-Syrian Government Palestinian groups, in the Shatila camp in southern Beirut resulted in one fatality and several injuries. On 9 March, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested a high-ranking Fatah Movement officer suspected of selling arms to extremist groups inside Palestine refugee camps in Lebanon. On 17 March, unknown assailants killed a member of the Joint Palestinian Forces in the Mieh Mieh camp near Sidon, causing the temporary closure of UNRWA schools and shops. On 10 June, the installation by the Lebanese Armed Forces of metal detectors at the entrances of the Ein El Helweh camp triggered peaceful protests by residents; the metal detectors were subsequently removed on 25 June.

37. There was no progress in dismantling the military bases maintained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada, which continue to compromise Lebanon's sovereignty and impede the ability of the State to monitor and effectively control parts of the border.

D. Arms embargo and border control

38. Several alleged violations of Lebanese airspace were registered by the Lebanese Government. In identical letters addressed to the Security Council and myself dated 6 April (A/72/831-S/2018/336), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations conveyed her Government's message that "on 31 March 2018, Israel violated Lebanese airspace, using an unmanned aerial vehicle armed with four missiles. It followed that by sending a second aerial vehicle to bomb the first aerial vehicle after it had crashed on the outskirts of the town of Bayt Yahun in the Bint Jubayl district." In identical letters addressed to the Security Council and myself dated 10 April (A/72/832-S/2018/342), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon conveyed her Government's message that "on 9 April 2018, four Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace... to conduct raids in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic," warning that "the repeated violation of its airspace by Israel to conduct raids in the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic poses a particular threat." On 9 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces stated that debris from several missiles had landed in southern and eastern Lebanon following an escalation in the Syrian Arab Republic.

39. In a letter addressed to the Security Council and myself on 29 May, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon conveyed her Government's message that, "on 22 May 2018, an Israeli warplane violated Lebanese airspace and circled over the city of Beirut." The letter further states that the "Israeli Government flaunted that violation by displaying photographs of the combat aircraft on 22 May 2018 at a conference of air force commanders held in Israel."

40. In identical letters addressed to the Security Council and myself dated 12 April (S/2018/345) and 7 June, the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations stated that "Lebanese violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) are daily occurrences." On 13 April, the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations conveyed a response from the Minister of National Defence rejecting allegations contained in the letter from Israel of 5 February (S/2018/91). On 11 May, the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed a letter to me that informed of "the strengthening of ties between two internationally recognized terrorist organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah" and that "Hamas has been building its own military force covertly in Lebanon."

41. Allegations of arms transfers to Hizbullah continued and are of serious concern. While taking such allegations seriously, the United Nations is not in a position to substantiate them independently.

42. Reports of Hizbullah's engagement in the fighting in the Syrian Arab Republic continued. On 6 June, Speaker Nabih Berri said that Hizbullah would only withdraw once "Syria is liberated and its territories are united". On 8 June, Hizbullah Secretary-General Nasrallah acknowledged that Hizbullah was "present in Syria where we should be present and where the Syrian leadership asked us to be present". A number of Lebanese nationals also allegedly continued to fight with non-State armed groups in the Syrian Arab Republic.

43. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued to deploy land border regiments and construct watchtowers along the border with the Syrian Arab Republic. On 29 May, the Central Training Centre for border security was inaugurated at Rayak Air Base, Biqa', with European Union funding.

44. Cross-border fire from the Syrian Arab Republic into Lebanon has decreased. Lebanese authorities arrested several smugglers for transporting Syrians illegally into Lebanon, as well as Syrians accused of entering Lebanon illegally.

45. On 5 and 23 April, the Lebanese Armed Forces arrested 15 Syrian nationals suspected of terrorist group affiliation and seized weapons and ammunition during a raid on an informal Syrian refugee settlement in Arsal. On 14 May, in Al-Hirmil, Lebanese General Security arrested two Syrian nationals over affiliation with terrorist groups. On 17 May, the Internal Security Forces arrested an alleged arms dealer in Akkar, north Lebanon.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

46. In mine-related incidents, two persons were killed and one injured outside Arsal on 6 March, a Syrian boy was injured outside Baalbek on 11 March and three people were killed outside Arsal on 12 April. One landmine explosion incident was recorded on 27 April in the UNIFIL area of operations in the vicinity of Yarun.

47. The Lebanese Armed Forces continued mine clearance operations along the eastern border. In the UNIFIL area of operations, six UNIFIL mine clearance teams cleared 5,436.5 m^2 of land and destroyed 581 anti-personnel mines and two unexploded ordnances. The United Nations Mine Action Service conducted 57 quality assurance monitoring visits and provided eight awareness briefings on landmines/explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices to 174 United Nations personnel. One mine risk education session was held in collaboration with the Lebanon Mine Action Center, an active partner in demining activities, benefiting 35 children. Some 150 United Nations personnel and over 600 school children attended two events organised by UNMAS on the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action on 4 April.

F. Delineation of borders

48. No progress was made towards the delineation or demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian Arab Republic and Israel have yet to respond to the provisional definition of the Shab'a Farms area proposed in my report of 30 October 2007 on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) (S/2007/641). In Shab'a town on 13 April, Prime Minister Hariri asserted that "recovering the Shab'a Farms and the hills of Kfar Shuba is the responsibility of the State".

49. The dispute between Lebanon and Israel over their exclusive economic zones remained unresolved. On 21 March, Hizbullah Secretary-General Nasrallah stated that Hizbullah would continue "to protect Lebanon's land, maritime territories". On

19 April, Speaker Berri underlined that "all political forces are united [against] any violation of Lebanon's rights — especially on the oil and gas issue.

50. On 29 May, caretaker Minister of Energy and Water Cesar Abi Khalil approved plans to explore maritime blocks four and nine. Part of block nine is situated in the area disputed by Lebanon and Israel. Khalil also announced that preparations for a second licensing round would proceed.

G. Political and institutional stability

51. On 6 May, Lebanon held its first parliamentary elections since 2009. At the end of the registration period on 27 March, 77 lists comprising a total of 597 candidates were registered to compete in 26 districts for 128 parliamentary seats. Of the 597 candidates, 86 (14.4 per cent) were women, up from 12 in 2009. The overall voter turnout for the elections was 49.2 per cent, down from 53.37 per cent in 2009.

52. Lebanon conducted its inaugural out-of-country voting on 27 and 29 April across 39 locations. Of the approximately 82,000 expatriates registered to vote, the turnout was reported as 59 per cent.

53. Official results allocate seats as follows: Future Movement, 21; Free Patriotic Movement, 20; Amal, 17; Lebanese Forces, 15; Hizbullah, 12; Progressive Socialist Party, 8; the "Determination (Azem)" movement of former Prime Minister Mikati, 4; Marada, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Kataeb and Tashnaq, 3 seats each. For the first time, a candidate representing civil society won one seat through the electoral list, "Koulouna Watani", in Beirut. The number of elected women in parliament increased from four to six.

54. As of 20 June, five candidates have brought challenges through the established electoral dispute resolution mechanism.

55. In my statement dated 8 May, I congratulated Lebanon on the holding of parliamentary elections. I noted that "the elections represent a vital step in strengthening Lebanon's State institutions and consolidating its democratic tradition" and that I was looking forward to the formation of the new Government. In a statement on 10 May, the International Support Group for Lebanon congratulated "the Lebanese people and authorities for the completion of parliamentary elections on 6 May ... in a generally calm and peaceful climate", encouraged "the swift formation of a new Government" and looked forward to "working with the new Government as it follows up on its international commitments, including under resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006)" and to "the resumption of a Lebanese-led dialogue towards a national defence strategy in the post-elections period".

56. At its first session, on 23 May, the new Parliament re-elected Nabih Berri as Speaker and elected Elie Ferzli as Deputy Speaker. In his acceptance speech, Speaker Berri underscored that Parliament would act as "a shield on our sovereign land, maritime and airspace borders in defending and in retaliating, using the power of the state, the people, the army and the resistance against Israeli aggressions and her constant violations of our borders, airspace, and regional waters". Berri emphasized that Parliament would work on "completing the implementation of resolution 1701, as well as the 13 border points on which the continuous Israeli presence poses a threat to the demarcation formula" and would address corruption and reform.

57. On 24 May, President Michel Aoun nominated Saad Hariri as Prime Minister-designate and tasked him with forming a new Cabinet. In a statement that day, Saad Hariri committed to working on the formation of a national unity Government as soon as possible. He stressed the importance of a Government that would further political

stability, strengthen state institutions and reinforce the economy. Consultations on the formation of the next Government continue.

58. On 14 June, President Aoun chaired a meeting with the International Support Group for Lebanon led by my Acting Special Coordinator. The Group submitted a joint aide-mémoire, laying out principles for consideration in the new Government's ministerial statement and programme of work. The Group welcomed the President's vision for an inclusive Government of national unity that could carry forward the agendas of resolution 1701 and recent international conferences in support of Lebanon.

59. Prior to the expiry of the mandate of the outgoing Government, on 21 May the Cabinet appointed all 10 members of Lebanon's National Human Rights Institution, which had been pending since its establishment by Parliament in 2016.

60. On 15 March in Rome, under the auspices of the International Support Group, I co-chaired with Prime Minister Gentiloni of Italy a ministerial-level meeting (the Rome II conference) to endorse the respective strategic plans of, and bolster international support for, the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces. Lebanon renewed its commitments regarding the extension of State authority and the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006) and 2373 (2017).

61. In his opening remarks, Prime Minister Hariri underscored the need to build State security institutions as "the sole defenders of Lebanon's sovereignty". He reiterated the Government of Lebanon's commitments to the policy of disassociation in order to shield Lebanon from regional conflicts and to accelerate deployments to south of the Litani, in line with resolution 2373 (2017).

62. The Government of Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL promoted the deployment of a Lebanese Armed Forces model regiment, increased maritime assets for the Lebanese Armed Forces and the establishment of a Lebanese Armed Forces regional civil-military cooperation centre in the UNIFIL area of operations.

63. In a joint statement, the 41 meeting participants endorsed the Lebanese Government's vision of the Lebanese Armed Forces as the sole defender of the Lebanese state and protector of its borders. Noting ongoing efforts to fully implement resolution 2373 (2017), participants called on the Government of Lebanon to accelerate effective and durable deployments to the South. Participants also pledged financial and materiel assistance in line with the updated capability development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the strategic plan of the Internal Security Forces.

64. Participants also welcomed the statement of President Aoun on 12 March, in which he announced that the National Defence Strategy would be discussed by Lebanese leaders following the parliamentary elections and the formation of a new Government. On 8 May, President Aoun publicly reiterated his intention to call for the parties to convene to discuss the implementation of the Taif Accords and a national defence strategy.

65. Following the Rome II conference, UNIFIL, in close coordination with my Acting Special Coordinator for Lebanon and potential donors, engaged with the Lebanese Armed Forces to develop a funding proposal for the deployment of the model regiment, including the establishment of an operational training centre, a headquarters and accommodation for the regiment. On 18 May, the Lebanese Armed Forces inaugurated its regional civil-military cooperation centre in Marjayoun.

66. The national strategy for the prevention of violent extremism, closely aligned with the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (see General Assembly resolution 70/254), was endorsed by the Council of Ministers on

27 March. An interministerial taskforce has been established to oversee implementation. The Government of Lebanon has developed an 18-month pilot project focused on building confidence among youth.

67. On 15 March, I participated in an extraordinary ministerial conference in Rome co-chaired by Egypt, Jordan and Sweden in support of UNRWA. Subsequent contributions have almost halved UNRWA's overall budget shortfall of $446 million. However, core services remain vulnerable, with no funding available to start the 2018-2019 school year.

68. On 29 March, Parliament approved the 2018 State budget, which cut all ministry budgets by 20 per cent, resulting in a slightly reduced deficit of $4.8 billion.

69. On 6 April, France hosted the Conference Economique pour le Développement et les Réformes Economiques (CEDRE), in support of the Lebanese economy. In line with the $16 billion capital investment plan, which lays out infrastructure priorities, the Government of Lebanon outlined sectoral and structural reforms necessary to maximize investments by international partners and the private sector. Approximately $10.2 billion in loans were pledged, including $9.9 billion in concessional terms, and $860 million in grants were announced. The CEDRE communiqué called for the establishment of a strong, transparent follow-up mechanism for the tracking of project implementation.

70. As of 31 May, 986,012 Syrian refugees were registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). New registrations of Syrian refugees by UNHCR remain suspended by the Government since 2015. A decrease in the number of registered Syrian refugees was due mainly to deaths, onward movements, resettlement and a small number of spontaneous returns to the Syrian Arab Republic.

71. Localized returns of Syrian refugees continued. On 18 April, nearly 500 Syrian refugees returned from Shab'a, South Lebanon to Bayt Jinn, Syrian Arab Republic, in a movement initiated by the Reconciliation Committee in Bayt Jinn and facilitated by the Lebanese and Syrian authorities. While UNHCR was not involved in organizing these returns, it counselled returning refugees on civil documentation and other critical issues for their re-establishment in the Syrian Arab Republic.

72. As of 31 March, overall available humanitarian resources for Lebanon in 2018 amounted to $1.016 billion, including $269 million disbursed by donors and $375 million committed funding for 2018, in addition to funds carried over from 2017. Reported figures show a lack of visibility regarding multi-year commitments beyond 2018, restricting longer-term approaches and planning beyond essential services, with $247 million reported as commitments for Lebanon beyond 2018.

73. The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan was 21 per cent funded as of 31 March, with $560 million, including $308 million carried over from 2017. This low funding impacted service delivery, especially in water and health sectors, to refugees and host communities.

74. From 24 to 25 April, the European Union and the United Nations jointly organized the "Brussels II" conference on the theme "Supporting the future of Syria and the region", which aimed to renew and strengthen the financial commitment of the international community to support the Syrian people, neighbouring countries, and communities most affected by the conflict. The Lebanon Partnership Paper, agreed between the Government of Lebanon and the international community, included commitments from the Government of Lebanon in support of the protection of refugees and vulnerable Lebanese communities, education, health and a conducive operating environment for international non-governmental organizations.

75. During May and June, caretaker Foreign Minister Bassil stated that UNHCR was "discouraging refugees from returning to Syria". On 11 June, UNHCR received official notification from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants to "change its approach", ordering a freeze on the issuance and renewals of residence permits for international UNHCR staff in Lebanon. UNHCR replied on 18 June. By a note verbale dated 22 June, my Deputy Special Coordinator requested the Government of Lebanon to continue to facilitate the work of all members of the United Nations country team in Lebanon, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 1946 Convention.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

76. UNIFIL continually reviewed its security plans and risk mitigation measures, particularly following security threat warnings, in close coordination with Lebanese authorities. Security exercises were conducted to test the readiness of civilian personnel and their eligible dependants in case of evacuation during a crisis. In the Arqoub area (Sector East), strict security measures have remained in place, including the use of armed escorts, for movements by United Nations personnel. The alleged presence of extremist elements in Ein El Helweh Palestinian Refugee Camp, situated in Sidon along the main supply route connecting the UNIFIL area of operations with Beirut, continues to pose a security concern, potentially affecting UNIFIL movements through Sidon. Lebanese security institutions maintain a strong presence in areas surrounding the camp.

77. On 4 March, clashes involving the Ansar Allah movement in the Rashidieh camp near Tyre (Sector West) resulted in two fatalities, five injuries, material damage and the closure of UNRWA facilities for a day. UNIFIL staff were advised to avoid the area.

78. Following the theft of 2,240 rounds of small arms ammunition from the United Nations position near Haris (Sector West) on 29 December 2017, following which all but 26 rounds were recovered, a UNIFIL Board of Inquiry submitted its report to United Nations Headquarters in April. Following inspections of all UNIFIL units to ensure that all measures were in place for the safety of staff and premises, as well as for the secure storage of weapons and ammunitions, security measures have been stepped up, including on deterrence, patrolling, monitoring, and access and departure control. The Lebanese investigating judge concluded his investigation, indicting nine persons, including seven minors, on 12 February. The case was transferred to the Permanent Military Court for judgment; a hearing is scheduled for 5 October.

79. UNIFIL continued to monitor ongoing proceedings in Lebanese military courts against individuals suspected of planning or perpetrating serious attacks against UNIFIL. The Permanent Military Court held hearings on 10 April regarding the attack against UNIFIL peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent in 2007 and in the case of terror intent opened in January 2014. The next hearings for both cases are scheduled for 17 December. In the case of attempted serious attack against UNIFIL in 2008, in which one of the four sentenced perpetrators filed an appeal, the next hearing is scheduled for 21 June. Three investigations launched into the serious attacks perpetrated against UNIFIL on 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 continue, pursuant to additional judicial instructions issued by the investigating judge. In the case of the homicide committed in 1980, when two UNIFIL peacekeepers from Ireland were shot dead and one injured, the Permanent Military Court deferred the issuance date of the decision, respectively, from 27 March to 24 April then to 26 June.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

80. As of 19 June, UNIFIL comprised 10,480 military personnel, including 500 women, from 41 troop-contributing countries; 239 international staff, including 78 women; and 583 national civilian staff, including 153 women. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force comprised four corvettes, two frigates, one helicopter and 764 of the Force's total military personnel, including 31 women. In addition, 58 military observers, including 5 women, from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, serve with Observer Group Lebanon, under the operational control of UNIFIL. In total, women accounted for 5 per cent of military personnel, 28 per cent of civilian personnel and just over 6 per cent of all UNIFIL personnel.

V. Conduct and discipline

81. During the reporting period, neither UNIFIL nor the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) received allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse. Both entities continued to implement and further enhance measures to prevent sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. The United Nations country team's prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse network in Lebanon, along with the sexual and gender-based violence working group, which includes international and national non-governmental organizations, continued to inform local communities of expected standards of conduct for United Nations personnel and how to report misconduct. UNIFIL and UNSCOL continued to promote a productive, harmonious and inclusive working environment, with special emphasis on protection against sexual harassment and other forms of prohibited conduct.

VI. Observations

82. Adherence by all sides to resolution 1701 (2006) remains essential for the stability of Lebanon and the region. I remain concerned over the lack of full implementation of the resolution and the unfulfilled obligations of Lebanon and Israel. Non-compliance increases the risk of tensions and possible escalation into hostilities. I call upon both parties to redouble their efforts towards the full adherence to resolution 1701 (2006) to sustain and consolidate the decade of calm that has prevailed.

83. The 6 May elections were key for the renewal of the Parliament's democratic mandate and a milestone for continued institutional reactivation. I congratulate the Lebanese people on the conduct of the elections and encourage them to remain engaged in the democratic process. I encourage Lebanon's political leadership and all political parties to work in the spirit of national unity to speedily form an inclusive Government, reflective of the voters' will. Important responsibilities await the new Government as part of the ambitious agenda laid out by Lebanon and the international community at the international support conferences in Rome, Paris and Brussels. I call upon all political actors to adopt measures to increase women's meaningful participation and representation at all decision-making levels.

84. I welcome the continued relative calm along the Blue Line, although risks of miscalculation remain. The events on the Golan on 10 May are a stark reminder that the security and stability in the UNIFIL area of operations, as well as in Lebanon in general, remain affected by wider regional dynamics. The incident of 12 April, during which the Israel Defense Forces and Lebanese Armed Forces deployed and pointed weapons, is of concern and demonstrates the fragility of the situation along the Blue

Line and the importance of UNIFIL's liaison. I call on all stakeholders in Lebanon and Israel to exercise restraint at all times and work towards moving from the current cessation of hostilities to a permanent ceasefire.

85. I commend the parties for their constructive engagement within the UNIFIL liaison and coordination arrangements, including on efforts to prevent tensions around sensitive areas along the Blue Line. I welcome the restated commitment to resolution 1701 (2006) of both parties in bilateral engagements with the United Nations and at the tripartite forum. I encourage all to build upon this commitment. My Acting Special Coordinator for Lebanon will continue to deploy good offices and, with the UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander, will explore opportunities with the parties for confidence-building measures.

86. In addition, resolving the dispute over maritime oil and gas resources in the exclusive economic zones of Lebanon and Israel could offer mutual economic benefits. I encourage both parties to continue to explore entry points to that end, in support of which my Acting Special Coordinator will continue to offer my good offices.

87. I condemn the presence of unauthorized weapons outside state control. Together with threatening rhetoric, it heightens risks of miscalculation and escalation into conflict. Pursuant to resolution 1701 (2006), I call upon the Government of Lebanon to take all actions necessary to ensure the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon so that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than those of the Lebanese State, in line with the Lebanese Cabinet decision of 27 July 2006.

88. I welcome President Aoun's statements on 12 March and 8 May, expressing his intention to convene a national dialogue towards a national defence strategy following elections and the formation of a Government. Such a strategy can only succeed if it is Lebanese-owned and Lebanese-led, comprehensive and sustainable, in recognition of the Lebanese Armed Forces as the only legitimate defender of Lebanon. Earlier decisions of the national dialogue should be implemented, specifically those relating to the disarmament of non-Lebanese groups and the dismantling of the military bases of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada.

89. I remain concerned about the continued violations by Israeli aircraft of Lebanese airspace. They constitute a danger for the Lebanese population and fuel bellicose rhetoric and sentiments against Israel. In this regard, I note with concern the Israeli armed unmanned aerial vehicle which crashed in the UNIFIL area of operations on 31 March. The Israel Defense Forces also continue to occupy northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). I reiterate my condemnation of all violations of Lebanese sovereignty and reiterate my call for Israel to cease its violations of Lebanese airspace and to withdraw its forces from northern Ghajar and the adjacent area north of the Blue Line.

90. I am concerned about Blue Line violations by Lebanese civilians, particularly in the Shab'a area, which led to several incidents with the Israel Defense Forces. I urge the Lebanese Armed Forces to address the issue of Blue Line ground violations by civilians.

91. The freedom of movement of UNIFIL in its entire area of operations and along the full length of the Blue Line is critical. I call on the Lebanese authorities to fulfil their responsibility to ensure unimpeded freedom of movement of UNIFIL.

92. As tensions have persisted in the region, Lebanon's policy of disassociation is more important than ever. I reiterate my call for Lebanon's adherence to the policy of

disassociation, consistent with the Baabda Declaration (2012), and for all Lebanese parties and nationals to cease their involvement in the Syrian conflict

93. I am encouraged by the steps the Government of Lebanon has taken to improve security along its eastern border as part of extending its authority throughout its territory. I continue, however, to condemn the movement of fighters and war materiel across the Lebanese-Syrian border in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). The lack of a delineated, demarcated Lebanese-Syrian border does not justify violations of Lebanese sovereignty by any party. I call upon all concerned to cease violations of the border and to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

94. I welcome the reaffirmation at the Rome II conference by the Government of Lebanon to its commitments under resolutions 1701 (2006) and 2373 (2017). I welcome the joint statement of the participants in the Rome II conference as a clear signal that international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces and State security institutions will continue.

95. Deepened cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces remains essential in furthering the strategic dialogue and implementation of resolutions 1701 (2006) and 2373 (2017). I am encouraged by the steady progress of UNIFIL in implementing the strategic review recommendations and by progress regarding the model regiment. I encourage the Lebanese Armed Forces, with continued support from UNIFIL and the international community, to step up efforts in operationalizing the regiment. I welcome the inauguration of the Lebanese Armed Forces regional civil-military cooperation centre in the South. Such steps illustrate the Government's continued commitment to reinforcing the Lebanese Armed Forces and extending State authority south of the Litani River. I look forward to progress regarding the acquisition of an additional vessel for the Lebanese Armed Forces.

96. UNIFIL continues to take proactive steps to implement resolution 2373 (2017), including through the enhanced tempo, visibility and effectiveness of its operations and its support to the Lebanese authorities in establishing an area between the Litani River and the Blue Line free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL. I welcome the measures taken by UNIFIL to increase the focus on inspections across the area of operations, including through permanent and temporary checkpoints and counter-rocket-launching operations, in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

97. I welcome the activation of the National Human Rights Institution. I call upon Lebanon's next Government to ensure that this body is adequately resourced to carry out its mandate in an independent and impartial manner, in accordance with international human rights standards. The United Nations in Lebanon stands ready to provide its support.

98. Delivering upon the structural, sectoral and fiscal reforms agreed at CEDRE is instrumental to safeguarding Lebanon's stability. The capital investment plan and accompanying economic vision provides an unparalleled opportunity. I encourage Lebanon's political leadership to implement urgent reforms that combat corruption, enhance transparency and streamline expenditures, and to establish a follow-up mechanism to track progress and ensure mutual accountability.

99. I thank the Government of Lebanon as it continues to exercise generosity and hospitality in temporarily hosting Syrian refugees. Noting the importance of continued international assistance to refugees and host communities, I thank participants in the Brussels II conference for their generous pledges. As needs continue to outpace available resources, I appeal to donors to increase their flexible, predictable, timely and multi-year support to Lebanon.

100. I am concerned by the discourse concerning refugee returns. I call on all to work in a spirit of partnership in line with international standards, including the principle of non-refoulement, until conditions are met for a safe, dignified and voluntary return. I reiterate the importance of redoubling the efforts of international partners to create a hospitable protection environment in the Syrian Arab Republic.

101. I also remain concerned by the continued plight of the Palestine refugees. I thank Member States for their support at the 15 March extraordinary meeting in support of UNRWA. I note with concern, however, that a shortfall remains, imperilling critical services. Continued insecurity in the Palestine refugee camps is of serious concern and points to the potential risks to stability should UNRWA services and operations be interrupted.

102. I extend my appreciation to all countries contributing military personnel and equipment to UNIFIL and Observer Group Lebanon. I commend Acting Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Pernille Dahler Kardel, and the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL, Major General Michael Beary, for their leadership, and I commend the civilian and military personnel of UNIFIL, as well as the staff of UNSCOL, for their continued efforts.

Annex I

Restrictions on the freedom of movement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon from 1 March to 20 June 2018

1. On 6 March, about 30 individuals, using two vehicles, blocked a UNIFIL patrol in Jumayjimah (Sector West), accusing the patrol of having taken unauthorized pictures. Following the arrival of the Lebanese Armed Forces at the scene, the patrol was able to leave the area. UNIFIL has since patrolled the area without incident.

2. On 12 March, an Observer Group Lebanon patrol encountered a chain across a new tertiary road in Dayr Siryan (Sector East), where two individuals signalled the patrol to leave the area. One of them, claiming to be a government official, insisted that UNIFIL was not allowed to enter the area. The Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that the location was private property. UNIFIL has increased its ground and air patrols in the area. UNIFIL has also used an alternative road to monitor the area and increased the number of counter-rocket-launching operations in the area. Observer Group Lebanon is also patrolling in Dayr Siryan, focusing on areas close to the Blue Line.

3. On 21 March, an individual in a vehicle stopped a UNIFIL patrol that was following-up on gunshots heard earlier on a secondary road in Hanin (Sector West) and asked the patrol to leave. Two other individuals on motorbikes arrived at the location, gesturing to UNIFIL to follow them back to the main road. As the UNIFIL vehicle had difficulties turning around, they hit it, causing minor damage. UNIFIL returned to the main road and resumed its patrol as planned. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese Armed Forces. Since the incident, UNIFIL has continued patrolling in Hanin without hindrance.

4. On 23 March, 10 individuals, including women, requested a UNIFIL patrol not to enter a road in Blida (Sector East) owing to the disturbance caused by the armoured vehicles. After bypassing the road, the patrol resumed its scheduled route. Subsequently, the mayor of Blida insisted that armoured vehicles could not enter the village owing to safety concerns. UNIFIL is following up with the authorities to find a solution. Since the incident, UNIFIL has continued patrolling in Blida using light vehicles only.

5. On 26 March, a UNIFIL patrol accompanied by the Lebanese Armed Forces was stopped on a narrow secondary road by several villagers in Jibal al-Butm (Sector West), after deviating, inadvertently, from the main road. The patrol left the area and continued its assignment. UNIFIL has since continued patrolling in Jibal al-Butm without incidents.

6. On 3 April, a UNIFIL patrol had to change its scheduled route after encountering a soil berm on a road south-west of Arab al-Wazzani (Sector East). The local authorities indicated to UNIFIL that the berm was placed by the land owner to prevent trespassing.

7. On 16 April, a UNIFIL patrol, in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, inadvertently entered a narrow road in Blida (Sector East). While attempting to exit the area, two men in civilian clothes blocked the UNIFIL patrol using a vehicle and a scooter. After the intervention by the Lebanese Armed Forces, the UNIFIL patrol was able to resume its activities.

8. On 19 April, seven individuals in civilian clothes blocked and surrounded an Observer Group Lebanon vehicle north of Hula (Sector East), using a vehicle and scooters. Before a second Observer Group Lebanon patrol and a quick reaction team dispatched by UNIFIL arrived at the scene, two intelligence personnel of the

Lebanese Armed Forces intervened, removed the civilians' vehicles and requested the Observer Group Lebanon patrol to leave the area. Observer Group Lebanon had conducted daily patrols to Hula in the past without any incidents. On 20 April, the mayor of Hula told UNIFIL that Observer Group Lebanon should be monitoring the Blue Line that is east of the village, but the patrol on 19 April was on the extreme western edge of the village. Observer Group Lebanon resumed patrolling the following day.

9. On 1, 2 and 3 May, individuals wearing uniform-like green attire stopped a UNIFIL foot patrol and four Observer Group Lebanon patrols at the gate of a facility of the non-governmental organization "Green Without Borders" along a secondary road in the vicinity of Aytarun (Sector West). The individuals informed the patrol that, in accordance with a decision by the Bint Jubayl municipality (Sector West), UNIFIL was not allowed to patrol the area. On 2 May, Bint Jubayl municipal authorities confirmed that the area had been designated as a natural reserve, with limited public access, to preserve the forest in that area, and that the gates were not meant to restrict the movement of UNIFIL. On 3 May, the Bint Jubayl union of municipalities informed UNIFIL that the Lebanese Armed Forces would provide UNIFIL with a detailed plan of "Green Without Borders" activities in Aytarun and propose an alternative route for UNIFIL to patrol the area. Patrols resumed, however, and on 11 May, two UNIFIL patrols, one in close coordination with Lebanese Armed Forces, were again stopped at the gate of the "Green Without Borders" facility. Both patrols completed their task using an alternative route. On 14 May, the Head of Mission and Force Commander of UNIFIL briefed the Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, General Joseph Aoun, about the series of incidents impairing UNIFIL's freedom of movement close to this facility. General Aoun assured him that the Lebanese Armed Forces Intelligence in Saida would address the issue and guarantee UNIFIL's full freedom of movement. Following multiple démarches by the Mission, on 19 June, UNIFIL Head of Mission and Force Commander and the South Litani Sector Commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces jointly visited the area and agreed to resume patrols in close coordination along the road, resulting in one patrol in close coordination through the area. The Head of Mission and Force Commander raised the issue again with the South Litani Sector Commander on 25 June.

10. On 9 May, four individuals in civilian clothes and a local police officer stopped a UNIFIL foot patrol, conducted in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, in Yatar (Sector West). Following a discussion with the individuals, the Lebanese Armed Forces informed UNIFIL that they would not patrol this particular area. The patrol returned to the base without completing its task. Also on 10 May, the municipal police in Yatar (Sector West) argued that UNIFIL should coordinate its patrols with the municipal police. Patrols resumed in the area without further incidents.

Annex II

Update on the implementation of the recommendations of the 2017 strategic review of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

1. Further to the letter dated 8 March 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2017/202) communicating the strategic priorities and key recommendations of the strategic review of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the present overview provides an update on the progress in the implementation of these recommendations.

Protection of civilians

2. UNIFIL continued its liaison with interlocutors from the Government of Lebanon on the protection of civilians and continued its close coordination with the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Lebanon.

3. As part of ensuring ongoing mission-wide preparedness, UNIFIL continued with the protection of civilians training. In April, UNIFIL organized a seminar with representatives of the civilian authorities and non-governmental organizations in charge of civil defence and the Lebanese Armed Forces to promote a better understanding of the UNIFIL mandate and the responsibilities of the Lebanese authorities regarding the protection of civilians. Participants explored ways to enhance the protection of civilians capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces and Lebanese authorities in the UNIFIL area of operations through future exercises and joint training to ensure preparedness.

Strategic dialogue mechanism

4. UNIFIL continued its consultations with the Government of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces on the deployment of the model regiment in the UNIFIL area of operations. The concept of operations for the model regiment was presented to potential donor countries at the Rome II conference held on 15 March. The Lebanese Armed Forces have appointed a commander and identified an area of responsibility for the model regiment within the UNIFIL area of operations. At present, the model regiment deployment process, which consists of eight phases, is in its second phase, which envisages the establishment of an operational training centre and the necessary accommodation infrastructure. UNIFIL continues to engage with the Lebanese Armed Forces and international partners to secure the required donor support.

5. With financial support from the Government of Spain and UNIFIL, the construction of the Lebanese Armed Forces regional civil-military cooperation centre was completed in Marjayoun. The centre was inaugurated on 18 May.

6. The Maritime Task Force continues to provide onshore and offshore training to the Lebanese Armed Forces-Navy. On 18 May, the Maritime Task Force certified the Lebanese patrol boat Tabarja and its crew to participate in maritime operations uninterrupted for 48 hours, in good weather conditions, alongside UNIFIL vessels. UNIFIL also conducted an internal study considering possible options for the deployment of an appropriate ship in Lebanese territorial waters.

Liaison and coordination with the parties

7. UNIFIL continues to advocate with the Israeli authorities for the establishment of a liaison office in Tel Aviv.

Structure of the uniformed and civilian components of UNIFIL

Land forces

8. In accordance with the recommendation of the strategic review, UNIFIL continued to enhance the coverage and effectiveness of coordinated operations between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, in the implementation of mandated tasks under Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

Maritime Task Force

9. The recommended reconfiguration of the Maritime Task Force has been implemented since 1 January 2018 as indicated in the previous report (S/2018/210).

Community outreach activities

10. The Community Outreach Board continues to convene on a quarterly basis to coordinate mission-wide outreach activities.

11. Following the inauguration of the Lebanese Armed Forces regional civil-military cooperation centre in Marjayoun, UNIFIL has stepped up its engagement with the centre by identifying areas for joint activities and a coordinated approach to community support in the UNIFIL area of operations. Officials of the centre also participated in UNIFIL civil-military cooperation coordination meetings.

Liaison in Beirut

12. UNIFIL and UNSCOL continued to meet with representatives of the Government of Lebanon, the Security Council and troop-contributing countries, including in relation to the Lebanese Armed Forces model regiment initiative. UNIFIL continued to advocate for the strengthening of the Lebanese Armed Forces presence in the south and to liaise with relevant United Nations agencies at country team coordination meetings.

United Nations S/2018/704

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 13 July 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 12 and 13 July 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) D. **Polyanskiy**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-11792 (E) 180718 200718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 13 July 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (12 July 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported six incidents of gunfire: five in Ladhiqiyah Governorate and one in Hama Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported two incidents of gunfire: one in Aleppo Governorate and one in Hama Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: one in Uwaynat al-Kabirah, Aleppo Governorate (650 food parcels with a total weight of over 2.8 tons were delivered); and one in Da'il, Dar'a Governorate (1,000 food parcels with a total weight of over 4.3 tons were delivered).

In total, 1,864 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,785.76 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 69 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 85,776 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (13 July 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported four incidents of gunfire: three in Aleppo Governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has reported one incident of gunfire in Idlib Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation in Husayniyah, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate: 650 food parcels with a total weight of over 2.8 tons were delivered.

In total, 1,865 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,788.56 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 36 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 87,777 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations S/2018/705

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 July 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 16 July 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, in accordance with paragraph (a) of annex I to resolution 2368 (2017).

I should be grateful if the present letter and the report could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Kairat **Umarov**
Chair
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

18-10599 (E) 090818

Please recycle

Letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team in accordance with paragraph (a) of annex I to resolution 2368 (2017) addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities

I have the honour to refer to paragraph (a) of annex I to resolution 2368 (2017), by which the Security Council requested the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team to submit, in writing, comprehensive, independent reports to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, every six months, the first by 31 December 2017.

I therefore transmit to you the Monitoring Team's twenty-second comprehensive report, pursuant to annex I to resolution 2368 (2017). The Monitoring Team notes that the document of reference is the English original.

(*Signed*) Edmund **Fitton-Brown**
Coordinator
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

Twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities

Summary

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),[a] having been defeated militarily in Iraq and most of the Syrian Arab Republic during 2017, rallied in early 2018. This was the result of a loss of momentum by forces fighting it in the east of the Syrian Arab Republic, which prolonged access by ISIL to resources and gave it breathing space to prepare for the next phase of its evolution into a global covert network. By June 2018, the military campaigns against ISIL had gathered pace again, but ISIL still controlled small pockets of territory in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Iraqi border. It was able to extract and sell some oil, and to mount attacks, including across the border into Iraq.

The net flow of foreign terrorist fighters away from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic remains lower than expected. Many fighters melt back into the local population and stay there, while others may lie low in certain neighbouring States. No other arena has emerged as a favourite destination for foreign terrorist fighters, although significant numbers have made their way to Afghanistan. In Europe, the great majority of nationals who leave the conflict zone and neighbouring States return home. Member States welcome Security Council resolution 2396 (2017) but some consider it insufficient and others are struggling to implement it.

Al-Qaida (QDe.004) showed its resilience in the Syrian Arab Republic, where Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (ANF) (QDe.137) may now be the strongest terrorist group, and where Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri (QDi.006) and his lieutenants based in the Islamic Republic of Iran were able to influence disputes among the fighters in Idlib, Syrian Arab Republic. Al-Qaida and its affiliates remain stronger than ISIL in Yemen, Somalia and parts of West Africa, while its alliance with the Taliban and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan remains firm despite rivalry from the local ISIL affiliate. The sustained coalition of terrorist groups in Mali and the Sahel is concerning and could supply a model for future cooperation and interchange between terrorists in some arenas. Some Member States see Al-Qaida as a greater long-term challenge to international security than ISIL.

Immediate concerns include the information gap on the current state of ISIL finances and what that indicates about its strategic intent, and the potential impact on existing terrorist networks of battle-hardened returnees and relocators, including "frustrated travellers"[b] and other sympathizers, who have leadership and other skills. Member States are concerned about the emergence, facilitated by the Internet, of new domestic terrorist threats, including from existing Al-Qaida networks. Meanwhile, the stabilization and reconstruction of ruined parts of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic pose other security-related challenges.

[a] Listed as Al-Qaida in Iraq (QDe.115).

[b] See S/2018/14/Rev.1, summary, footnote b.

Contents

		Page
I.	Overview of the threat	5
	A. Status of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant	5
	B. Developing threat from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida	5
II.	Regional trends	7
	A. Levant	7
	B. Arabian Peninsula	9
	C. Africa	10
	D. Europe	14
	E. Central and South Asia	15
	F. South-East Asia	17
III.	Impact assessment	19
	A. Resolution 2347 (2017)	19
	B. Resolution 2388 (2017)	20
IV.	Sanctions measures	21
	A. Travel ban	21
	B. Asset freeze	22
	C. Arms embargo	22
	D. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions list	23
V.	Monitoring Team activities and feedback	23
Annex		
	Litigation by or relating to individuals and entities on the Sanctions List	25

I. Overview of the threat

A. Status of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

1. By January 2018, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had been defeated in Iraq and was confined to small pockets of territory in the Syrian Arab Republic. During the reporting period, Syrian government forces made progress against ISIL strongholds in the Damascus area. Nevertheless, ISIL showed greater resilience in the east of the Syrian Arab Republic, and even slightly recovered the initiative. Several Member States attributed this to a reduced contribution by the mainly Kurdish People's Protection Units contingent of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to the campaign in the east in early 2018. As the Syrian Democratic Forces increased its military activity once more, the momentum of the fighting appeared to be turning against ISIL again by June 2018.[1]

2. Many ISIL fighters, planners and senior doctrinal, security and military commanders have been killed in the fighting, and many fighters and other personnel have left the immediate conflict zone. Many, however, remain in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, some still fully engaged militarily and others hiding out in sympathetic communities and urban areas.

3. Some Member States estimate the total current ISIL membership in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic to be between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals, roughly equally distributed between the two countries. Among these is still a significant component of the many thousands of active foreign terrorist fighters.[2]

4. ISIL is still reverting from a proto-State structure to a covert network — a process that is most advanced in Iraq — but its fragments of territory in the Syrian Arab Republic give it more options and strategic depth on the border. Despite the damage to bureaucratic structures of the so-called "caliphate", the collective discipline of ISIL is intact. Although he is reported to have been injured, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi[3] remains in authority; it is just more delegated than before, by necessity, to the wider network outside the conflict zone. The general security and finance bureaus of ISIL are intact. The group's immigration and logistics coordination office is also intact, although it is having difficulty communicating and its chief has been killed.[4]

5. The Amaq news outlet of ISIL also continues to function in the eastern Syrian Arab Republic. Propaganda is an indicator of the financial and organizational health of ISIL and of its strategic intent. ISIL media activity reached a low point of output in September and October 2017; since then, it has stabilized at a higher level. The balance of media activity has moved from the ISIL core to the affiliates. ISIL propaganda remains weaker than it was and its brand may have been tarnished.[5]

B. Developing threat from Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al-Qaida

6. The flow of foreign terrorist fighters towards ISIL in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has essentially come to a halt. The reverse flow, although slower than expected, remains a serious challenge. One Member State describes the methodical

[1] Member State information.
[2] Member State information.
[3] Listed as Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai (QDi.299).
[4] Member State information.
[5] Member State information.

but opportunistic and fragmented movement of ISIL returnees and relocators as posing a "devolved threat", with such returnees and relocators planning to bed down wherever possible, with the intent to return to active resistance, insurgency and terrorism when circumstances allow. The stabilization of the military position of ISIL may encourage significant numbers of foreign terrorist fighters to remain in the conflict zone.[6]

7. Despite all of this, some Member States have reported a fall in the rate of terrorist attacks in Europe, which began in late 2017 and has continued into 2018. There may be a causal connection between this and the military near-defeat of the so-called "caliphate": ISIL command and control was damaged; the planned mergers of some bureaucratic units were not accomplished without disruption; and many of the most active terror-planners and operatives were killed in targeted strikes.[7]

8. Nevertheless, some Member States assess that the underlying drivers of terrorism are all present and perhaps more acute than ever before. This suggests that any reduction in terrorist attacks is likely to prove temporary, until ISIL manages to recover and reorganize, Al-Qaida increases its international terrorist activity or other organizations emerge in the terrorist arena.[8] Already, Member States make a distinction between the decline in the number of successful plots and the sustained level of inspired terrorist activity, which suggests that what has driven this relative calm is not a loss of terrorist motivation but disruption of the capacity of ISIL to plan and execute attacks.

9. It seems likely that a reduced, covert version of the ISIL core will survive in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, with a presence also in neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, significant ISIL-affiliated numbers also exist in Afghanistan, Libya, South-East Asia and West Africa, and to a lesser extent in Somalia, Yemen, Sinai and the Sahel. The foreign terrorist fighter component of these varies and is largest in Afghanistan. There are also a number of small, emerging cells in other countries and regions. The rising threat from this global network will be diverse and hard to predict.

10. Meanwhile, the global Al-Qaida network continues to show resilience. Al-Qaida's affiliates and allies are much stronger than those of ISIL in certain places, including Somalia, Yemen, South Asia and the Sahel. Al-Qaida leaders in the Islamic Republic of Iran have grown more prominent, working with Aiman al-Zawahiri and projecting his authority more effectively than he could previously. They have influenced events in the Syrian Arab Republic, countering the authority of Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani (QDi.317) and causing formations, breakaways and mergers of various Al-Qaida-aligned groups in Idlib.[9]

11. Hamza bin Laden (not listed) has also continued to emerge as a leadership figure in Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida's leadership demonstrates strategic patience and its regional affiliates exercise good tactical judgment, embedding themselves in local issues and becoming players. While there is as yet little evidence of a re-emerging direct global threat from Al-Qaida, improved leadership and enhanced communication will probably increase the threat over time, as will any rise in the tendency, already visible in some regions, of ISIL supporters to join Al-Qaida.[10]

[6] Member State information.
[7] Member State information.
[8] Member State information.
[9] Member State information.
[10] Member State information.

II. Regional trends

A. Levant

12. ISIL continues to transition from a proto-State structure into a terrorist network. It has lost large amounts of territory in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, and the cities that it once controlled have been liberated. Nevertheless, with the temporary reduction in SDF military pressure in early 2018, ISIL has been able to hold on to territory in eastern Dayr al-Zawr province, where it still controls some small towns and villages. Its main concentration of fighters, including the remaining foreign terrorist fighters, is on the eastern side of the Middle Euphrates River Valley, and it holds strategically significant ground in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Iraqi border.[11] ISIL is still able to mount attacks inside Syrian territory. It does not fully control any territory in Iraq, but it remains active through sleeper cells. It has fighters hiding out in Al-Anbar desert, the Ghadaf Valley and in Al-Hussainiah, west of Rutbah. ISIL has limited ground from which it can launch attacks inside Iraq, primarily targeting security force bases. A planned attack on 22 February 2018 against the Enazza border point with Saudi Arabia was disrupted.[12]

13. Member States report that many senior ISIL leaders have been killed in the conflict, including significant political, doctrinal, security and military figures. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi remains in control, although there are reports that he has been injured, and that ISIL has decentralized its leadership structure to mitigate further losses. Member States assess that, despite the casualties that they have suffered, many ISIL members intend to continue to fight. Others are now hiding in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey, representing a potential threat to these countries and the wider region. Others have been arrested by Syrian government forces or anti-ISIL non-State armed groups, including Kurdish forces.[13]

14. ISIL has some residual presence in other Syrian localities, including a foothold in Aleppo.[14] The densely populated Rukban camp in southern Syrian Arab Republic contains some 80,000 internally displaced persons, including families of ISIL fighters, a situation which Member States fear might generate new ISIL cells.[15] The presence of the ISIL-aligned Jaysh Khalid Ibn al-Waleed (QDe.155) in Dar'a, in the extreme south-west of the Syrian Arab Republic is another concern for Member States in the region. It is in close proximity and on hostile terms with local elements of Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant (ANF) (QDe.137) in Dar'a and Qunaytirah.[16]

15. The continuing transition by ISIL from a territorially based terrorist group to a covert terrorist network has made its finances more difficult to discern. Its financial reserves have declined but not dried up, and one Member State estimates its total reserves to be in the low hundreds of millions of United States dollars.[17] It appears that ISIL can still draw on some of its traditional funding streams, including hydrocarbons and extortion, earning millions of dollars per month.[18] In its previous report, the Monitoring Team highlighted the group's loss of control of oil and natural gas fields (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 9); however, the slowdown of military progress against ISIL in early 2018, mentioned earlier, allowed the group to regain access to

[11] Member State information.
[12] Member State information.
[13] Member State information.
[14] Member State information.
[15] Member State information.
[16] Member State information.
[17] Member State information.
[18] Member State information.

some oil fields in north-eastern Syrian Arab Republic.[19] As a result, oil remains a primary source of revenue, with the group using primitive methods to extract it, both for its own consumption and for sale to locals, in addition to the extortion of distribution networks.[20] ISIL also continues to "tax" commerce in areas it controls, as well as in contested areas, and to kidnap local businesspeople for ransom, extracting relatively small amounts of money in local currency.[21]

16. Despite the damage to the group's quasi-State bureaucratic structures, ISIL maintains some financial structures, and financial direction still emanates from the core leadership.[22] Reports persist that ISIL members have managed to invest in the region and infiltrate businesses, such as construction companies, money exchanges,[23] agricultural entities, fisheries and real estate, including hotels (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, paras. 12–13). Concerns have also been raised about ISIL financial facilitators and networks moving their operations to neighbouring countries.[24]

17. ISIL is still able to channel funds across borders, primarily by relying on hawala networks and money service businesses (both unwitting and complicit ones), as well as cash couriers.[25] Furthermore, the ISIL core appears to continue to support its affiliates financially, although the extent of this support is unclear and may be declining.[26] A key tactic used by ISIL is to route funds through intermediary countries, with ISIL directing funds to a transit country before the funds are moved to the destination.[27]

18. Some Member States in the region view the ANF menace as comparable to that of ISIL, with both posing a threat to the international community. ANF is assessed to remain the controlling force within the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) umbrella, which has accordingly been added by the Sanctions Committee as an alias of ANF. Syrian national Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani is the leader of both ANF and HTS. HTS maintains a position of strength in Idlib province, but is under pressure from other Syrian opposition groups.[28] Member States assess that HTS and its components still maintain contact with Al-Qaida leadership.

19. Member States report that Aiman al-Zawahiri, partly through the agency of senior Al-Qaida leadership figures based in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Abu Muhammad Al-Masri[29] and Sayf Al-Adl (QDi.001), has been able to exert influence on the situation in north-western Syrian Arab Republic. According to one Member State, HTS recently seized territories from Ahrar Al-Sham (not listed) and other armed groups after being reinforced by the arrival of military and explosives experts from Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Some ISIL fighters, such as the leader of the ISIL Green Brigade in north-western Syria, have also joined HTS.[30]

20. Nevertheless, al-Zawahiri has signalled dissatisfaction with some aspects of al-Jawlani's leadership, especially his prioritizing of governance and the holding of territory over commitment to international terrorism. Dissent within HTS caused defections led by Sami al-Aridi (not listed) and Iyad Nazmi Salih Khalil (QDi.400),

[19] Member State information.
[20] Member State information.
[21] Member State information.
[22] Member State information.
[23] See, for example, the Narrative Summary of Reasons for Listing of Al-Kawthar Money Exchange (QDe.157).
[24] Member State information.
[25] Member State information.
[26] Member State information.
[27] Member State information.
[28] Member State information.
[29] Listed as Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah El Alfi (QDi.019).
[30] Member State information.

which resulted in the formation of a new group under the name of Ansar al-Din. Other significant new groups opposing Jawlani include Jabhat Tahrir Suria and Helf Nusrat Al-Islam, which emerged from the merger of Hurras Al-Deen and Ansar Al-Tawheed.[31] Member States assess, however, that HTS will hold together, despite the tensions within its ranks, with the Al-Qaida core and with other opposition groups in the area. All groups are expected to make a stand and fight any Syrian and international forces that attempt to dislodge them.

21. Extortion remains a primary source of financing for ANF, which earns money through its control of Idlib and checkpoints, including by "taxing" the movement of commercial commodities.[32] Kidnapping for ransom of locals is another source of revenue, and the group may earn some funds through external donations.[33] Member States expressed continuing concern about the vulnerability of cultural sites, museums, antiquities and artefacts in areas under ANF control.

B. Arabian Peninsula

22. Member States assess that Al-Qaida leadership maintains a strong structure in the Arabian Peninsula, especially inside Yemen, where the organization continues to plan and orchestrate terrorist attacks in the wider region and beyond. The leadership of the Al-Qaida core recognizes Yemen as a venue for guerrilla-style attacks and a hub for regional operations. The lack of a strong central Government in Yemen has provided a fertile environment for Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (QDe.129) to establish itself.[34] Hamza bin Laden issued a statement in March 2018, citing the role of AQAP, threatening Saudi Arabia and calling on the people of the Arabian Peninsula to revolt.[35]

23. In Yemen, sectarian polarization stimulated by the war with the Houthis attracted many recruits to AQAP, whose main base is still the city of Mukalla. It also has an operational presence in Wadi Belharith and Azzan in Shabwah, Wadi Obaidah in Ma'rib, Radda'a city in Bayda', and Lawdar, Wadi and Mudiyah in Abyan. Against the backdrop of a security vacuum and a lack of public services in many areas, AQAP sponsors and participates in public activities, seeking to build a reputation for humanitarianism and governance (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 20). It has avoided being aggressive or confrontational with tribes, biding its time to gain more recruits, explore new sources of funds and prepare new young leaders. Its total strength inside Yemen is currently estimated at between 6,000 and 7,000.[36]

24. AQAP Yemeni Emir Qasim Mohamed Mahdi al-Rimi (QDi.282) heads a precise leadership structure, including doctrinal, propaganda, military, security and financial subdivisions. Since mid-2017, the organization has suffered losses of leadership and field commanders owing to extensive Yemeni and international counter-terrorist operations. Some Member States report that explosives expert Ibrahim al-Asiri (QDi.291) may have been killed during the second half of 2017. Given al-Asiri's past role in plots against aviation, this would represent a serious blow to operational capability.[37]

---

[31] Member State information.
[32] Member State information.
[33] Member State information.
[34] Member State information.
[35] Cristina Maza, "Hamza Bin Laden, Osama's son, denounces Saudi Arabia, calls for overthrow of monarchy in new Al-Qaeda video", *Newsweek*, 19 January 2018. Available from www.newsweek.com/hamza-bin-laden-osama-saudi-785121.
[36] Member State information.
[37] Member State information.

25. Information from Member States in the region indicates that the group continues to use improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices as its preferred tactic against targets in Yemen, along with multiple rocket launchers (BM-21 and Grad-P), surface-to-air missiles (SA-7 and SA-9) anti-aircraft autocannons (ZU-23), mortars, mechanized infantry combat vehicles (BMP) and anti-tank missiles (TOW), which were used in late December 2017 in targeting a military training camp for elite forces in Wadi Dawan, Hadramawt governorate.[38] The group also acquires weapons during raids on military bases and training camps.

26. The Monitoring Team previously reported that AQAP had looted the central bank branch in Mukalla in 2015 (see S/2016/629, para. 24). One Member State has provided an update indicating that the group then offered to sell or exchange that stolen currency, the equivalent of $100 million, at a discounted rate ($600,000 per $1 million stolen). Thus, having more money in 2015, AQAP could offer higher salaries and increase its membership. Nevertheless, in December 2017, AQAP failed in an attempt to rob private banks in Mukalla. The group continues to kidnap Yemenis and foreigners for ransom. It may also have some funds left from previous oil sales.[39]

27. Member States assessed that AQAP was unique among Al-Qaida franchises in being entrusted with a leading role in propaganda and media on behalf of the leadership of the Al-Qaida core. In parallel to *Inspire*, the English-language Internet magazine, the *Al Masra* Arabic-language magazine is now the Al-Qaida platform where leaders of affiliates from the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (QDe.014), Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiin (Al-Shabaab) (SOe. 001) are interviewed and announce attacks

28. Member States report that ISIL commands only 250 to 500 members in Yemen. It focuses on Yemeni and United Arab Emirates official targets inside Yemen. Although much weaker than AQAP, it tries to compete and frequently claim responsibility for high-profile attacks also claimed by AQAP.[40] The local ISIL affiliate is led by Yemeni national Muhammad Qan'an Al-Saya'ri (a.k.a Abu Usama Al-Muhajir) (not listed) who also directs military affairs. Yemeni national Radhwan Qanaf (not listed) is the deputy; Yemeni national Khalid Al-Marfadi (not listed) is head of financial affairs; and there are also military commanders of Ma'rib, Ibb, Dali' and Aden.[41] Member States in the region assess that the extreme ideology and brutality of ISIL are unappealing to the Yemeni population.

C. Africa

1. North Africa

29. ISIL remains present in Libya, abetted by the fluid security situation, some tribal support and coordination with other terrorist groups when expedient. Despite the loss of Sirte and continued airstrikes, ISIL still has the capacity to launch significant attacks within Libya and across the border, reverting to asymmetric tactics and improvised explosive devices. ISIL cells persist around Tripoli, Misrata and Sabratah in the west, with a substantial presence in southern Libya around Ghat and Al Uwainat, and Ajdabiya and Darnah in the east.[42]

[38] Member State information.
[39] Member State information.
[40] Member State information.
[41] Member State information.
[42] Member State information.

30. Estimates of ISIL numbers vary between 3,000 and 4,000 individuals dispersed across the country.[43] Its central command in Libya may lie in the triangle between Bani Walid, southern Sirte and Jufrah district.[44] The leadership structure is headed by Abu Moaz Al-Tikriti (not listed), an Iraqi national who is reportedly still alive despite reports of his death in an airstrike.[45]

31. Al-Qaida continues to resurge in Libya, its ranks composed of elements of its historical component, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (QDe.011), as well as shura councils in Darnah,[46] Benghazi[47] and Ajdabiya. AQIM in the Sahel, led by Yahya Abu al-Hamam (not listed), maintains networks of mutual financial support and arms supply with Al-Qaida in Libya.[48]

32. The mountainous areas in the west of Tunisia continue to harbour elements of ISIL and Al-Qaida. The country is affected by the fluid situation in Libya. In April 2018, the Tunisian Armed Forces began counter-terrorism operations around Kasserine against the AQIM affiliate Uqba Ibn Nafi Battalion and Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia, during which it dismantled several ISIL sleeper cells in the region.[49]

33. In Egypt, military operations, which began in Sinai in February 2018, continue against Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM). The group pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in November 2014. Some Member States assess that the group may consist of up to 1,000 fighters and are concerned that it continues to exhibit signs of resilience.

34. Member States assess that returning foreign terrorist fighters, particularly those of North African origin, continue to pose a threat to the region. One Member State in the region noted that those returnees buoyed the ranks of Jund al-Khilafa in Algeria (QDe.151) and Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141), renewing the ability of those organizations to carry out operations.[50]

35. ISIL continues publicly to threaten electoral processes in North Africa. Municipal elections in Tunisia and presidential elections in Egypt proceeded without incident despite such threats; however, ISIL attacked the High National Elections Commission of Libya in Tripoli in May 2018, resulting in 13 deaths.[51]

36. Member States reported that terrorist groups in North Africa derived substantial income from kidnapping for ransom, local extortion and the "taxing" of smuggling routes. During the reporting period, however, there was no evidence that they were directly involved in trafficking in drugs or persons.

2. West Africa

37. In the Sahel, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) successfully combined regional terrorist groups in an Al-Qaida-affiliated coalition,[52] which increased attacks and propaganda against French, United States of America and other

[43] Member State information.
[44] Member State information.
[45] Member State information.
[46] Darnah Mujahideen Shura Council, a rebranding of Ansar al Charia Darnah (QDe.145).
[47] Benghazi Mujahideen Shura Council, a rebranding of Ansar al Charia Benghazi (QDe.146).
[48] Member State information.
[49] Member State information.
[50] Member State information.
[51] Remarks of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya Ghassan Salamé to the Security Council on 21 May 2018.
[52] As mentioned in S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 32. The groups are Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (QDe.014), Ansar Eddine (QDe.135), Al Mourabitoun (QDe.141) and the Macina Liberation Front.

international interests during the reporting period.[53] On 8 May 2018, AQIM urged attacks on French private companies.

38. JNIM leader Iyad ag Ghali (QDi.316) promotes combat action against security forces, rather than attacks on the population.[54] JNIM continues to rely on Al Mourabitoun to bring enhanced operational capabilities for complex attacks on symbolic targets (see S/2018/14/Rev.1 para. 33). On 2 March 2018, attacks on the French Embassy and the armed forces headquarters in Ouagadougou were claimed by JNIM as revenge, after several Al Mourabitoun commanders were killed on 14 February 2018. On 15 April 2018, JNIM combined mortar and rocket strikes with breaches by suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, coupled with the use of small arms fire, on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and French military bases in Timbuktu, Mali.[55] A sleeper cell was neutralized in Ouagadougou on 22 May 2018. One Member State assesses that JNIM may be concentrating its efforts on the Ménaka area.

39. In absorbing the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), JNIM reinforced its territorial control. MLF dominates central Mali and gives a possible ethnic dimension to JNIM, which has developed specific propaganda on the local fight against foreign aggressors.[56]

40. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is active mostly at the border between Mali and the Niger.[57] Although ISGS has a lesser footprint than JNIM, they both share the goal of destabilizing the Sahel and any normalization of life there, to maintain freedom of movement in the north and access to smuggling routes.[58] Current pressure on ISGS, and the lack of support from the ISIL core, will probably generate closer cooperation with JNIM, but not a merger.[59]

41. In Burkina Faso, Ansarul Islam is divided in two factions. Jafar Dicko (not listed), the brother of deceased Ansarul Islam founder Malam Dicko (not listed), has a personal relationship and shared tactical interests with MLF leader Amadou Koufa (not listed).[60] Member States assess that JNIM might look towards Ansarul Islam, particularly Dicko's faction, as part of its strategy to expand the network further abroad. The second faction is led by Bolly Oumarou Idrissa dit Oumi (not listed), the notorious leader of a criminal network, who is personally close to ISGS.[61] The impact of Ansarul Islam is considerable given its quasi-control over the Soum and Oudalan regions, where security has been undermined by assassinations and kidnappings. Despite limited capabilities — 90 fighters for Dicko and 70 for Bolly[62] — Ansarul Islam can rely on a proven tactic, with attacks that are carried out by four to six groups of two people on motorcycles who then disappear in the local environment.[63]

42. Member States assess that terrorists are taking advantage of territorial control and ethnic conflicts to radicalize populations, particularly in areas from which school professors have been driven out by intimidation.[64] The number of doctrinally based non-governmental organizations sending funds to local terrorist groups is growing, and Member States are concerned that radicalization is increasing the threat level in

[53] Member State information.
[54] Member State information.
[55] Member State information.
[56] Member State information.
[57] Member State information.
[58] Member State information.
[59] Member State information.
[60] Member State information.
[61] Member State information.
[62] Member State information.
[63] Member State information.
[64] Member State information.

the Sahel.[65] In the Mopti-Ségou area, the JNIM harassment strategy was successful as schools reopened under the control of extremists.[66] In Bamako, the balance of doctrinal guidance has shifted against the electoral process and in favour of radical elements.[67] Meanwhile, Boko Haram (QDe.138)[68] and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have had a similar impact in their areas of control, including the Lake Chad basin.

43. The predominance in the region of the cash economy, without controls, is conducive to terrorist groups funded by extortion, charitable donations, smuggling, remittances and kidnapping.[69] In Nigeria, 111 schoolgirls from the town of Dapchi were kidnapped on 18 February 2018 and released by ISWAP on 21 March 2018 in exchange for a large ransom payment.[70]

3. East Africa

44. Al-Qaida affiliate Al-Shabaab remains the dominant terrorist group in Somalia.[71] Despite sustained military offensives against it, the group has enhanced its capabilities as it retains its influence and appeal. It has diversified its modus operandi and easily adopts guerrilla warfare when attacked or retreats into the local community for safe haven to reorganize. In late 2017, Al-Shabaab reinforced its presence in Banadir near Mogadishu, enabling it to conduct recent attacks in central Mogadishu.

45. Al-Shabaab mounts attacks mainly within Somalia, targeting the troop bases of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and continues to conduct incursions into neighbouring countries. In early 2018, about 200 Al-Shabaab fighters were killed and others injured, which led to dispersal into smaller groups as a strategy for reorganizing. This disrupted its operations to some extent and had an impact on morale, as some fighters relocated to different parts of Somalia.[72]

46. Al-Shabaab continues to deploy improvised explosive devices as its weapon of choice. Member States assess that the group has the requisite materials and expertise in assembly, that it has enhanced the potency of its improvised explosive devices by increasing the average size in recent years[73] and that it sources weapons and ammunition from local militia and defectors from the Somali National Army and through the smuggling of light weapons from Libya and Yemen (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 39). In late 2017, Al-Shabaab overran four Somali National Army bases and confiscated supplies, vehicles and military equipment of unknown value, which can sustain the group for some time.[74] During the reporting period, the funding sources of Al-Shabaab remained the same (see S/2017/573, para. 47, and S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 40).

47. Member States assessed that, although ISIL in Somalia is fragile and operationally weak, it still presents a threat because Somalia remains a focus for probable future ISIL operations.[75] ISIL in Somalia has the strategic intent to expand to central and southern Somalia despite its current constraints. Towards this end,

[65] Member State information.
[66] Member State information.
[67] Member State information.
[68] Listed as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad (QDe.138).
[69] Member State information.
[70] Member State information.
[71] Member State information.
[72] Member State information.
[73] Al-Shabaab increased the size of improvised explosive devices from 5 kilos to 40 kilos and the size of the explosive charges in vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices from about 100–200 kilos to 800–1000 kilos between 2015 and 2018.
[74] Member State information.
[75] Member State information.

Abdikadir Mumin (not listed) has been communicating with local fighters about his intentions to expand southwards to consolidate existing cells and win over some local fighters.[76] Additionally, as the ISIL core loses ground in the Syrian Arab Republic and comes under pressure in Libya, Somalis of dual nationality, and perhaps some other foreign terrorist fighters, may move to Somalia and other countries in the region, boosting ISIL numbers, skills and operational capabilities.[77] Specifically, some Somali foreign terrorist fighters operating in the Syrian Arab Republic have been in communication with Mumin and may choose to relocate to Puntland.[78]

48. Some Member States continue to deal with foreign terrorist fighters affiliated with both Al-Shabaab and ISIL who are moving from their territories into Somalia, as well as with individuals relocating from other conflict zones who attempt to transit their territory by exploiting existing porous borders. Member States also reported ongoing recruitment, radicalization and training online, as well as forced conscription and camps established within Somalia, which are reserved for new foreign terrorist fighters.

49. Meanwhile, ISIL faces a resourcing crisis in Somalia. Its strategy to seize and take over supply points such as ports is not viable, so the group has resorted to robberies and other criminality to fund its activities. It still receives limited financial support and military supplies, including small arms and light weapons from ISIL in Yemen (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 42).

D. Europe

50. During the reporting period, the threat in Europe remained high; however, the tempo of attacks and disrupted plots was lower than during the same period in 2017. Member States said that much terrorist activity involved individuals with no prior security records, or others who had been dismissed as low risk. In addition, recent terrorist attacks were perpetrated by individuals who had never travelled to a conflict zone. The attacks tended to use cheap, unsophisticated methods, such as blades and vehicles, but were high impact because they were deliberately perpetrated in crowded civilian areas. There has also been an increased use or attempted use of triacetone triperoxide explosives.[79] Many terrorist plotters had prior petty criminal records.

51. ISIL continues to use social media to urge its sympathizers in Europe to conduct attacks in their country of residence. The 2018 FIFA World Cup became a specific target for ISIL propaganda aimed at inspiring lone or self-directed individuals to conduct attacks during the tournament. The group continues to disseminate various attack methodologies, as well as instructions for creating bombs and explosive vests. The recent trend has been away from directed and enabled attacks towards inspired attacks, which is a result of the degradation of the external operational capabilities of ISIL. Nevertheless, both ISIL and Al-Qaida have recently shown interest in more sophisticated attacks, including with chemical materials or remotely controlled improvised explosive devices.[80]

52. Member States noted that flows of returnees and relocators from Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic had not materialized to the degree expected, but that the vast majority of those who had successfully left the conflict zone and surrounding area had returned home rather than relocating elsewhere. Member States expressed concern that such individuals could increase the threat by disseminating their

[76] Member State information.
[77] Member State information.
[78] Member State information.
[79] Member State information.
[80] Member State information.

knowledge and skills related to drones, improvised explosive devices and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. Some ISIL fighters had the ability to assemble weapons from commercial off-the-shelf items. Beyond such operational impacts of the movement of foreign terrorist fighters, their return to Europe might galvanize local sympathizers.[81] In this regard, measures taken by Member States that had largely prevented travel to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic has created a different problem, with aspiring foreign terrorist fighters becoming "frustrated travellers". ISIL has thousands of these supporters who are active online and represent recruitment opportunities for terrorist networks. Despite the weakening of the ISIL core and the reduced quality of its propaganda, the high quantity of messages sent using commercial encryption still has a strong impact in the spheres of radicalization, recruitment and instruction.[82]

53. Radicalization in European prisons is a continuing and growing concern for policymakers. Meanwhile, some of those imprisoned for terrorist offenses in earlier years will soon be released, and a number of attempts planned in prison have already been foiled. On 29 May 2018, a radicalized inmate seized the opportunity of temporary release to kill two police officers and a bystander in the Belgian city of Liège.[83]

54. Member States highlighted the complex challenge posed by female returnees from conflict zones: some saw women as part of the solution, but others saw them as a security concern and threat. While many women were confined to the household, some actively participated in the recruitment of new fighters on social media, some received weapons training and some took part in the fighting. Member States emphasized that returning children posed an even more complex challenge for law enforcement and social services, and it remained debatable what threat they might pose. The background and nationality of some children born in conflict zones are unclear. Many were exposed to extreme ideology, while some were involved in fighting and violence, including taking part in propaganda videos.

55. Member States reported that there was no concrete evidence of collaboration between terrorist groups and organized crime in Europe, beyond some overlap involving procurement and migration routes, especially in the Balkans. One Member State assessed that the main methods used by ISIL foreign terrorist fighters and sympathizers to raise funds included financial support from their families and relatives, as well as petty fraud, ranging from document forgery to small loans to counterfeit goods.

E. Central and South Asia

56. Al-Qaida still maintains a presence in South Asia. It adapts to the local environment, trying to embed itself into local struggles and communities. It is closely allied with the Taliban. According to one Member State, although ISIL poses an immediate threat, Al-Qaida is the "intellectually stronger group" and remains a longer-term threat. Some members of the Al-Qaida core, including Aiman al-Zawahiri and Hamza bin Laden, are reported to be in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. Other members of the Al-Qaida core may leave for more secure areas.

57. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (QDe.010) still commands about 500 fighters in Afghanistan, concentrated in Faryab, Sari Pul, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakhshan provinces. Around another 500 Central Asian fighters are

[81] Member State information.
[82] Member State information.
[83] Member State information.

distributed between Khatiba Imam Al-Bukhari (QDe.158), Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad (not listed), Islamic Jihad Union (QDe.119) and ISIL. The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (QDe.088) commands 400 fighters in Badakhshan.[84] Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) is relatively isolated owing to increased security measures within the wider region, but the group continues to seek security gaps for opportunistic attacks. The group, Al-Qaida's newest affiliate, is ideologically inclined to carry out attacks inside India but its capability is believed to be low. According to Member States, the strength of AQIS in Afghanistan is estimated at several hundred people, located in Laghman, Paktika, Kandahar, Ghazni and Zabul provinces.[85]

58. The ISIL core continues to facilitate the relocation of some of its key operatives to Afghanistan. One Member State reports that foreign terrorist fighters who are nationals of Algeria, France, the Russian Federation, Tunisia and Central Asian States have recently arrived in Afghanistan, and that Abu Qutaiba (not listed), the ISIL leader in Salah al-Din province of Iraq, has reportedly relocated to Badakhshan province of Afghanistan.

59. One Member State reports that some recent plots detected and prevented in Europe had originated from ISIL in Afghanistan. In addition to establishing a presence across Afghanistan, ISIL also attempts to have an impact on other countries in the region. According to one Member State, ISIL in Afghanistan is responsible for at least one attack in the Kashmir region.

60. In Pakistan, extensive counter-terrorist operations are reported to have led to a reduction in the number of terrorists and terrorist training facilities, and in the quantity of locally available explosive material in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Some of the terrorists were displaced across the border into Afghanistan.[86]

61. In Afghanistan, ISIL persistently tried to expand its presence, despite pressure from the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces, the international coalition and the Taliban. ISIL currently has its main presence in the eastern provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar and Nuristan, and is also active in Jowzjan, Faryab, Sari Pul and Badakhshan provinces in the north. ISIL has the intention to expand into Ghazni, Kunduz, Laghman, Logar and Uruzgan provinces. In Kabul, Herat and Jalalabad, ISIL already has sleeper cells and has committed disruptive, high-profile attacks, including against both Government and Taliban targets during the Eid al-Fitr ceasefire.[87]

62. The numerical strength of, and the nature of the external threat potentially emanating from, ISIL in Afghanistan is the subject of much discussion among Member States. These issues are covered in detail in the ninth report of the Monitoring Team pursuant to resolution 2255 (2015) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities, published in May 2018 (S/2018/466). There has not yet been any consensus based on Member State evidence to substantially alter the key judgments in that report, which include the following: that ISIL has between 3,500 and 4,000 members in Afghanistan, including between 600 and 1,000 in northern Afghanistan (with both numbers on the increase); that it is led by Abu Sayed Bajauri (not listed); that the majority of its members and its leaders were formerly members of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (QDe.132); and that it may represent an emerging threat to Central Asian States.

63. In Central Asia, the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan is perceived to be growing, with foreign terrorist fighters who have returned from the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq increasing their numbers in Afghanistan. Returnees have skills in

[84] Member State information.
[85] Member State information.
[86] Member State information.
[87] Member State information.

weapons and improvised explosive devices, knowledge of warfare tactics, and connections with criminal groups. One Central Asian Member State reported that there were currently up to 1,000 fighters, including nationals of the Russian Federation and Central Asian States, making their way to Afghanistan, where there were already assessed to be 750 nationals of Central Asian States, mainly from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They were considered to feel comfortable relocating among Afghans of Uzbek and Tajik ethnicity.[88]

64. In Central Asia, Member States consider that there are indigenous sympathizers with ISIL. Nevertheless, one Central Asian State says that no foreign terrorist fighter is known to have arrived in the region since the beginning of 2018.[89] This needs to be monitored, given the natural interest of terrorists on either side of the Afghan border in each other.

F. South-East Asia

65. The terrorist threat to South-East Asia persists, particularly from ISIL-aligned groups in the region. Despite heavy losses in the southern Philippines in 2017, ISIL affiliates in the country are cash-rich and growing in membership.[90]

66. In May 2018, Indonesia suffered a wave of attacks that killed dozens, including the attackers. Over two days, members of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 56, and S/2017/573, para. 62), an ISIL-linked local network of cells whose spiritual leader is Oman Rochman (QDi.407), and their families carried out two successful attacks, while one was disrupted by the authorities.[91] On 13 May, a family of six, including a 9-year-old girl, conducted three suicide bombings against Christian churches in Surabaya, while on 14 May a family of five detonated two motorcycle bombs at the entrance to the local police headquarters in Surabaya, killing all of the bombers except for an 8-year-old girl.[92] Also, on 13 May, another family of six had been constructing bombs in nearby Sidoarjo when one prematurely detonated, killing two of the family members.[93] ISIL claimed responsibility for the successful attacks through its Amaq news outlet but seems to have played no direct role; nonetheless, it seems that the three families at least knew one another.[94] This could become a troubling precedent as a new modus operandi of using families, including women[95] and children, as suicide bombers.[96] These attacks were preceded by a riot in a prison in Depok near Jakarta and succeeded by a vehicle and sword attack on provincial police headquarters in Riau. ISIL also claimed responsibility for both attacks.

67. In the southern Philippines, the threat from terrorism persists despite losses suffered by groups linked to ISIL during the siege of Marawi City (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, paras. 58 and 59), with remnants regrouping, reactivating training camps and recruiting, attracting hundreds of followers both inside and outside the Philippines.[97] Furthermore, post-Marawi arrests of suspected foreign terrorist fighters

[88] Member State information.
[89] Member State information.
[90] Member State information.
[91] Member State information.
[92] Member State information.
[93] Member State information.
[94] Member State information.
[95] Previously, would-be female suicide bombers were arrested in Indonesia. See Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict), "Mothers to bombers: the evolution of Indonesian women extremists", 31 January 2017.
[96] Member State information.
[97] Member State information.

who were not South-East Asian, some of whom travelled to the Philippines using stolen or false documents and/or broken travel routes, indicates that the southern Philippines continues to be a magnet as a destination and transit point for foreign terrorist fighters from outside the region, in part because it presents an opportunity for militants to engage in actual combat and owing to the availability of firearms.[98]

68. The local affiliate of ISIL, also known as ISIL-Philippines or Daulah Islamiyah, comprises several groups, including the remnants of the Maute Group,[99] led by Owaida Mulok Abdulmajib (aka Abu Dar) (not listed); the Maguid Group, led by Mohamad Karem (aka Abu Muhamad) (not listed); the Turaifie Group, led by Esmael Abdulmalik (aka Abu Turaifie) (not listed); and the Basilan-based branch of the Abu Sayyaf Group (QDe.001) (ASG), led by several sub-leaders, including Furuji Indama (not listed).[100] Nevertheless, with the death of Isnilon Totoni Hapilon (QDi.204), the affiliation of the Basilan-based ASG with ISIL is less clear, as many members have disassociated themselves from ISIL and focused more on criminal activities to raise funds rather than on ideology.[101] As of the writing of the present report, a replacement for Isnilon Totoni Hapilon as overall leader of ISIL affiliates in the Philippines has not been identified.[102]

69. ASG continues to be led by Radulan Sahiron (QDi.208) and to engage in kidnapping for ransom and extortion to sustain itself.[103] Nevertheless, kidnapping incidents, particularly kidnappings at sea, decreased in 2017 compared with 2016, possibly owing in part to the tougher maritime patrols under the trilateral cooperative arrangement among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.[104] ASG has been targeting mostly locals in "express kidnappings" as opposed to more high-profile maritime kidnappings.[105]

70.. Recent domestic designations have highlighted the key role of intermediaries in the ISIL network in South-East Asia with regard to financing, procurement of weapons and training, and also demonstrated connections among regional players, as well as between regional operatives and the ISIL core.[106] For example, intermediaries have facilitated financial transfers from the ISIL core to ISIL affiliates in the Philippines and arranged bomb-making and firearm training for JAD recruits from Indonesia at camps in the Philippines.

71. According to Member States, ISIL affiliates in the Philippines do not lack financial resources. In addition to having received funding from the ISIL core, they secured millions of dollars by looting banks and homes in Marawi and have been using those funds to recruit, reportedly paying would-be fighters a joining fee of $300 to $400 and also providing a firearm.[107]

---

[98] Member State information.
[99] S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 58; S/2017/573, paras. 59 and 60.
[100] Member State information.
[101] Member State information.
[102] Member State information.
[103] Member State information.
[104] Member State information.
[105] Member State information.
[106] United States Department of the Treasury, "Treasury sanctions ISIS-Philippines facilitator for terror support", 30 April 2018; and "Treasury sanctions ISIS facilitators across the globe", 9 February 2018.
[107] Member State information.

III. Impact assessment

A. Resolution 2347 (2017)

72. During the reporting period, the Team continued to engage with Member States and relevant international organizations on the looting and smuggling of antiquities by ISIL, ANF and other terrorist groups, and to promote awareness of the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime, together with the implementation of resolution 2347 (2017), as an operational tool for disrupting their ability to generate resources from this activity.

73. Several Member States reported to the Team investigations and seizures of antiquities from Iraq, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen. In addition, archaeological sites in the region continue to be subject to illegal excavation and destruction since the competent authorities are unable to supervise all of such territories.[108] At the first level of trafficking, local populations earn money by bringing artefacts to collectors. The collectors regroup them and then pay taxes at each stage to Al-Qaida and ISIL members, where such terrorists are in control, until they have moved the products outside the region.[109]

74. Member States highlighted that ISIL likely generated funding through these trafficking activities while at the peak of its territorial control, but it is difficult to assess whether it has stored objects or is otherwise still able to profit. Accurate data are elusive. Most looted and smuggled antiquities were small and easily negotiable online, which complicates counter-trafficking operations,[110] as does the large number of fake artefacts on the market.

75. New trafficking routes and destinations were discovered, particularly in South America, for antiquities illegally removed from Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic and the region.[111] One Member State highlighted that several positive matches were obtained using the International Council of Museums Red Lists,[112] which classifies endangered types of artefacts into 17 geographical categories. Some of these categories refer to regions of the world, while others are countries, including Iraq, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.

76. **The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to highlight the usefulness of the International Council of Museums Red Lists as a tool for prima facie examination of cultural property by customs and law enforcement officers as well as for their training in this regard.**

77. Based on the legal and regulatory framework, customs authorities of Member States are a pivotal stakeholder in the practical implementation of control mechanisms that can stem the flow of smuggled antiquities. In 2016, the Team identified administrative changes to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System of the World Customs Organization as one potential measure (see S/2016/213, para. 28). Chapter 97 of the nomenclature is divided into several general headings under which antiquities can be addressed: for example, heading (97.03) is designed

[108] Member State information.

[109] Member State information.

[110] For example, a Member State presented a case involving boxes of antiques proposed for online sale that had been looted fr[illegible] the Idlib museum, which was controlled by the Al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant.

[111] Member State information.

[112] International Council of Museums, Red Lists Database. Available from http://icom.museum/resources/red-lists-database.

to record trade of statues of any kind and age. This single classification could include a new wooden statuette or an ancient marble sculpture.

78. Similar rules regulate paintings, drawings and pastels (97.01), engravings, prints and lithographs (97.02), coins and other collectors' pieces of historical, archaeological and ethnographic interest (97.05). Further specifications, like subheadings according to age and/or historical or archaeological interest of the item, would enable national authorities to better identify, through a more detailed risk analysis, potentially relevant antiquities and hold those which are intentionally wrongly declared. This would provide more time for investigation into their origin and ownership history. Proposals for possible amendments to the nomenclature and to the explanatory notes to chapter 97 were recently submitted to the World Customs Organization and are currently under examination.

79. **The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States, encouraging them to support the proposed amendments to chapter 97 of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System that are currently under examination by the World Customs Organization.**

B. Resolution 2388 (2017)

80. Several Member States informed the Monitoring Team that they welcomed the guidance contained in resolution 2396 (2017) regarding returnees and relocators, including the handling of women and children leaving the conflict zone. Member States are striving to enhance information exchange on the identities of foreign terrorist fighters, and cooperation continues to improve gradually between countries of origin and transit countries. Many returnees and relocators have been prosecuted or otherwise processed. Nevertheless, some Member States were of the view that the resolution did not go far enough in ensuring that countries of nationality and origin took their fair share of responsibility for handling foreign terrorist fighters.

81. There are assessed to be between several hundred and 2,000 foreign terrorist fighters held in detention in northern Syrian Arab Republic, and a far greater number in detention in Iraq, where Member State estimates range between 9,000 and 20,000, depending upon whether family members are included. The Monitoring Team is mandated by resolution 2388 (2017) to explore with Member States the issue of trafficking in persons and perpetration of sexual violence in armed conflict by ISIL and Al-Qaida. This issue may have affected some of the women and children who left the conflict zone and are now detained. Up to now, the Monitoring Team has met with a limited response to its efforts to collect information on this subject, despite the abuses of the so-called "caliphate". Member States assess that sexual exploitation has never been a significant source of income for ISIL, but they lack information on other aspects of the issue.

82. **The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States, reminding them of the provisions of resolution 2388 (2017) and drawing attention to the likely availability of increasing amounts of relevant information over time, as more returnees and relocators, including women, are processed in transit or on arrival at their destinations. Member States should be encouraged to be alert to the opportunity to gather this information in order to identify persons or entities who transfer funds to ISIL in connection with the exploitation and abuse of women and children for listing by the Committee.**

IV. Sanctions measures

A. Travel ban

83. During the first half of 2018, no travel by individuals on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List was reported to the Monitoring Team.[113] Meanwhile, few foreign terrorist fighters entered the conflict zone, and the reverse flow of foreign terrorist fighters, or their dispersal to other conflict zones, proved slower than expected. Member States continued to enhance measures to address this flow, including by preventing travel, and collecting and sharing information bilaterally and multilaterally. Member States are concerned about the status and location of many foreign terrorist fighters still believed to be in Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic, who may change tactics and manage to relocate despite tightened border controls. Some Member States still face challenges in identifying foreign terrorist fighters, returnees or relocators at their air, land and sea border points. This presents significant security risks and may be exploited by ISIL (see S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 73).

84. Since the adoption of resolutions 2309 (2016) and 2396 (2017), the Monitoring Team has continued to engage Member States, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Air Transport Association and private sector stakeholders on efforts to implement advance passenger information (API) and passenger name record (PNR) systems to enable effective screening against the Sanctions List and databases listing foreign terrorist fighters. There has been progress in a number of Member States in the collection, processing and dissemination of passenger data. Currently, many Member States have API systems in place. In addition, some have upgraded from batch API systems to interactive advance passenger information (iAPI) systems. Compliance with regard to PNRs is much lower, however.[114]

85. Effective 23 October 2017, API became an ICAO standard. This requires Member States to establish API systems supported by appropriate legal and institutional frameworks and consistent with internationally recognized standards. Member States are expected to establish a "single window" for processing API data, meaning that data should be sent to only one government entity, which then dispatches the data to all relevant stakeholders. The single window aims to strengthen information sharing between airlines and government agencies, minimize errors in data transmission and enhance cooperation and coordination. Member States are required to have redress mechanisms for passengers who are unjustly affected, based on their API data. This is to ensure that passenger data are processed with safeguards to ensure data privacy, are obtained fairly and legally, are relevant and are not stored for illegitimate purposes or an excessive period of time. All API data should conform to specifications for the United Nations Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce and Transport passenger list message (UN/EDIFACT PAXLST) format.[115]

86. If harmonized with effective watchlists and biometrics, API and PNR data can support the detection of listed individuals and foreign terrorist fighters, reduce the frequency of false positives during passenger screening at border points and facilitate legitimate travel. Nevertheless, challenges exist in several Member States, where work is needed to improve border screening, enhance effectiveness in the checking

[113] Member State information.

[114] Member State information.

[115] International Civil Aviation Organization, International Standards and Recommended Practices, annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Facilitation, 15th edition (October 2017), para. 9.8.

of passenger data against watchlists, collect biometric information and enhance the timeliness and effectiveness of information sharing.[116]

87. The Monitoring Team continued its engagement with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and noted that Member States continue to utilize INTERPOL databases and have provided information on foreign terrorist fighters, which has facilitated the arrest and prosecution of some foreign terrorist fighters or their facilitators. Nevertheless, in some Member States, border agencies and airlines lack access to such information: about two thirds of INTERPOL members do not have connectivity to the databases at their air, land and sea ports of entry.

B. Asset freeze

88. The Team continued to cooperate with the Financial Action Task Force and its regional-style bodies to collect information about its ongoing initiatives to counter terrorist financing, implement the asset freeze and promote awareness of the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. The Task Force adopted a consolidated strategy to combat terrorist financing and an operational plan to focus its work in ensuring regular updates about evolving terrorist financing risks, enhanced information sharing and appropriate and effective use of the Task Force standards and targeted United Nations financial sanctions to identify and disrupt terrorist financing activity. Despite the significant work undertaken to date, the Task Force's mutual evaluation process revealed that such targeted financial sanctions are not being utilized in an effective manner and that further efforts must be undertaken.

89. The loss of territory by ISIL has cut its revenue and may force it to diversify its sources of income. Member States anticipate a trend towards Al-Qaida-style asymmetric tactics and the planning of low-cost operations conducted by cells that exploit financing methods such as kidnapping for ransom, petty crime, credit and insurance fraud and financial crimes over the Internet. Furthermore, Member States highlighted the risk of the increased use of new techniques that make it easier to evade controls, such as electronic wallets, crowdfunding and cryptocurrencies.

90. **The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee write to Member States to draw their attention to methods of terror financing likely to become increasingly prevalent as ISIL loses its last quasi-State streams of income, to highlight the risk of an increased global incidence of kidnapping for ransom, among other revenue-generating crimes and methods of financing, to encourage Member States to continue to exchange information and expertise in countering these crimes and to draw attention to the fact that paying ransoms or making political concessions to terrorist groups finances and assists their activities and incentivizes further kidnappings.**

C. Arms embargo

91. The Monitoring Team continued to focus on the issue of weapons reaching ISIL, Al-Qaida and their affiliates. In this regard, Member States insist that the continued flow of arms and munitions to terrorist groups remains a primary concern and that porous borders and the diversion to terrorist organizations of shipments intended for legitimate military or civilian use remain a challenge to counter-terrorism efforts.

92. ISIL and its affiliates reportedly reached a high level of sophistication in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, the weaponization of drones (see

[116] Member State information.

S/2018/14/Rev.1, para. 87) and the production of improvised recoilless launching systems.[117] Consequently, Member States assess that one of the dangers posed by returned foreign terrorist fighters is the knowledge garnered in conflict areas on the use of weapons and the manufacture of improvised explosive devices.

93. Member States reported that the use of improvised explosive devices is likely to increase as ISIL reverts to asymmetric tactics. A main precursor of choice for the manufacture of such devices where ISIL controls some territory is ammonium nitrate. ISIL in Afghanistan was reportedly using smuggled quantities of this compound (see S/2018/466, paras. 55 and 76) and Member States reported attempts to smuggle the same compound to Libya on-board a ship seized by Greece in January 2018. Improvised explosive devices made from triacetone triperoxide, which can be manufactured from common household items, were increasingly used by lone actors. Investigations made publicly available noted that this was the material used in the Surabaya bombings in Indonesia in May 2018. Member States reported that instructions for the construction of such explosives was, on occasion, obtained from social media platforms.

D. Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List

94. The Secretariat, in cooperation with the Monitoring Team, is currently testing a new enhanced data model which can add biometric data, including pictures of listed individuals, to the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions List. The Secretariat noted that adding picture information will exponentially increase the size of the file, which may pose difficulties for downloading the list. The Secretariat confirmed that the current data model of the list is compatible with the advance passenger information system. To address the needs of end users in the financial, civil aviation and other relevant sectors, the Secretariat is also considering developing a search engine and a mobile application that will reduce the need for users to download and print the list.

V. Monitoring Team activities and feedback

95. Between January and June 2018, the Monitoring Team conducted 17 country and technical visits. It continued to promote the sanctions regime through its participation in 28 international conferences, meetings and workshops, including those of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the European Union, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The Team also held two regional meetings of intelligence and security services focusing on the threat posed by ISIL, Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities. The Team raised awareness among the participating services concerning the potential use of the sanctions regime as an integral part of a national counter-terrorism strategy and encouraged more intensive sharing of information in the region to counter the threat.

96. The Team continued its engagement with entities and associations in the financial, energy, antiquities, and information and communication technology sectors. During the reporting period, the Team continued to work with Internet companies and participated in several workshops organized by Tech Against Terrorism. During these events, the Team raised awareness of the provisions of the sanctions regime and the

[117] Conflict Armaments Research, "Technical Report on Islamic State Recoilless Launcher Systems", April 2018. Available from www.conflictarm.com/technical/islamic-state-recoilless-launcher-systems.

Sanctions List. The Team cooperates closely with the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate in the production of reports of the Secretary-General as mandated in paragraph 101 of resolution 2368 (2017). The Team remains an active member of the working groups of the Office of Counter Terrorism's Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, participating in its working groups. The Team also promoted attendance by the counter-terrorism agencies of Member States at the United Nations High-level Conference of Heads of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States, held at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 28 and 29 June.

97. The Team welcomes feedback on the present report through 1267mt@un.org.

Annex

Litigation by or relating to individuals and entities on the Sanctions List

1. The legal challenges involving individuals and entities on the Sanctions List, or whose names the Committee has removed therefrom, that are known to be pending or to have been recently concluded are described below.

Pakistan

2. The action brought by the Al Rashid Trust (QDe.005) regarding the application of the sanctions measures against it remains pending in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, on appeal by the Government of an adverse decision in 2003. A similar challenge brought by Al-Akhtar Trust International (QDe.121) remains pending before a provincial high court.[1]

3. In addition to the two cases mentioned above, a trustee of Pakistan Relief Foundation (listed as an alias of Al-Akhtar Trust International (QDe.121)) has challenged the freezing of his bank account.[2]

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

4. The United Kingdom is defending judicial review challenges to its decision-making with regard to the designations under this sanctions regime of Abdulbasit Abdulrahim, Abdulbaqi Mohammed Khaled and Maftah Mohamed Elmabruk (all delisted). The cases are currently proceeding with hearings related to the use of closed evidence, and the level of disclosure required.[3]

[1] Information provided by Pakistan.
[2] Information provided by Pakistan.
[3] Information provided by the United Kingdom.

United Nations A/72/939–S/2018/706

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
25 July 2018
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 37
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Identical letters dated 29 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of May 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 37, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Amal **Mudallali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-12418 (E) 300718 070818

Please recycle

Annex to the identical letters dated 29 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed in May 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 May	1130	The herder Isma'il Sa'b took his livestock to graze on the outskirts of the town of Shab'a, near observation point OP1, which is staffed by the Indian contingent of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The livestock returned at 16.30 hours without the shepherd. At 2020 hours, the liaison unit of the UNIFIL reported that the shepherd had been detained by the Israeli enemy.
	1715	From inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the town of Khiyam near Barad al-Tuffah, the Israeli enemy hurled four smoke bombs towards several civilians in Sahl al-Khiyam. The bombs landed inside Lebanese territory, but no one was injured.
3 May	1000	A Lebanese Army patrol came across a suspicious object, which appeared to be a bomb, inside Lebanese territory near point BP87. It is believed that the object was one of the four smoke bombs that the Israeli enemy hurled towards civilians in Sahl al-Khiyam on 2 May 2018.
	1000 1035	The sound of several bursts of medium and light weapon fire was heard around the Summaqah outpost in the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1130	On the outskirts of Shab'a town, near observation point OP2, which is staffed by the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, the Israeli enemy released shepherd Isma'il Sa'b, whom they had abducted on 2 May 2018. The enemy did not coordinate his release with UNIFIL.
	1145	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite point BP14 and the town of Rumaysh, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Merkava tank, 10 personnel and a police dog crossed the technical fence, proceeding on their way approximately 20 metres without crossing the Blue Line. They inspected the site and photographed the Lebanese Army position at the wall. Meanwhile, the tank pointed its cannon towards the position. The hostile patrol left at 1235 hours and returned to occupied Palestinian territory.
	1700	Inside Lebanese territory, in the area of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Husayn Yunis found balloons in the garden of his house that had Hebrew writing on them. A Lebanese Army patrol was dispatched to the site. The patrol took the balloons and began an investigation.
8 May	1600 1900	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, on the outskirts of Sha'ba town, several bursts of light and medium military-weapon fire were heard.
9 May	0940	Inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Army checkpoint at Udaysah, the Israeli enemy installed a camera on an emplacement opposite the checkpoint and pointed it towards Lebanese territory. At 1300 hours, the Israeli enemy removed camera.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
10 May	1530	On the outskirts of Kafr Shuba town, in the locality of Birkat Ba'tha'il, some 48 cows crossed the so-called line of withdrawal. They headed back towards the occupied territories at 1940 hours.
11 May	1148	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a construction vehicle stopped opposite the town of Udaysah, at point TP37. Four soldiers descended from the vehicles and carried out maintenance work on the technical fence. One of the soldiers pointed a 12.7 mm calibre machine gun towards Lebanese territory. The work ended at 13.10 hours and the hostile patrol left in the direction of occupied territory.
	1715 1750	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the sound of light and medium military-weapon fire was heard.
12 May	915	On the outskirts of Kafr Shuba town, in the locality of Birkat Ba'tha'il, some 25 cows crossed the so-called line of withdrawal. They headed back towards the occupied territories at 1730 hours.
14 May	1510 1600	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, several bursts of light and medium military-weapon fire were heard.
	2215	An Israeli enemy foot patrol approached from inside occupied Palestinian territory, opposite the Wazzani resort. The patrol members directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territory before leaving at 2310 hours.
15 May	1210	Opposite Yarun, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising one Hummer vehicles and two civilian vehicles arrived at the Jabal al-Tayyarat west position and carried out maintenance work there. As they were working, a member of the enemy patrol pointed his weapon towards the members of a Lebanese Army patrol that was on the Lebanese side of that location. The enemy patrol departed and headed into occupied territory at 1320 hours.
16 May	1000	Inside occupied territory, opposite the Rumaysh gate position, a Merkava tank crossed the technical fence near the Khallat al-Budiyah position. The tank took up a position at that location and pointed its cannon towards Lebanese territory, without violating the Blue Line. The tank departed and headed towards the Rumaysh gate at 1100 hours.
	1600	As the shepherd Mahir Hamdan was tending to a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, locality of Shahl, an Israeli enemy foot patrol consisting of eight personnel crossed some 30 metres past the line of withdrawal (the Blue Line, to which a claim is maintained in that area) and attempted to abduct him, but it failed.
21 May	1535	As the civilian Isma'il Zahra was tending to a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, in the locality of Khallat al-Wasi'ah–Jabal al-Shahl, an Israeli enemy foot patrol comprising eight personnel emerged from inside the occupied Shab'a Farms and fired into the air in the direction of the herd, which was inside Lebanese territory. No one was injured in the incident.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
23 May	1550	As the civilian Qasim Zahrah was tending to a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, locality of Birkat al-Naqqar, opposite position C7-4, which is staffed by the Indian contingent of UNIFIL, a nine-person Israeli enemy that was inside the occupied Shab'a Farms fired two rounds towards Lebanese territory. No one was injured in the incident.
24 May	1420	As the civilian Isma'il Zahrah was tending to a herd of livestock on the outskirts of Shab'a town, in the locality of Sha'b al-Maqil–Jabal al-Shahl, an Israeli enemy patrol fired into the air in the direction of the herd. No one was injured in the incident.
28 May	0640 0800	Inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, on the perimeter of the Ruwaysat al-Alam position, two Merkava tanks were observed moving and the sound of several burst of medium and light weapon fire was heard.

Sea violations committed in May 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 May	0530	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011 for an eight-minute period, proceeding on its way some 70 metres. The crew of the launch used loudspeakers to warn off a Lebanese fishing vessel and launched a noise bomb inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
4 May	1810	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 130 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
5 May	1834	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 185 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
8 May	2119	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a five-minute period.
9 May	2100	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
11 May	0300	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0330	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
13 May	1813	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a one-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
15 May	0217	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0222	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a two-minute period.
	0229	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0330	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 10-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 535 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0402 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 73-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 515 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0415	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0739	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0955	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 204 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
18 May	0255	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 60-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 425 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0301	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period.
	0307	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for an 18-minute period.
	0322	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a 10-minute period.
	0348	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a seven-minute period and sounded warning sirens.
19 May	1805	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a seven-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1834 hours, it violated the boundary again for a six-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2128	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a four-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 55 metres. The launched fired three flares towards a Lebanese fishing vessel that was in Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
20 May	2005	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for an 11-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 407 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 2035 hours, it violated the boundary again for a 9-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	2040	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launched a flare shell over Lebanese territorial waters.
22 May	1232	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 13-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1336	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 29-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 425 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1338	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 27-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 May	1416	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 20-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 500 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1500	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 28-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 460 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1502	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 26-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 555 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1600	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 20-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 220 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1837	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 260 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
23 May	0336	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 350 metres. During the incursion, a searchlight was directed towards Lebanese territorial waters for one minute. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0346 hours, it violated the boundary again for a two-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 515 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 0359 hours, it violated the boundary yet again for a 21-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 570 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0412	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a three-minute period.
26 May	1122	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 10-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
29 May	0802	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 205 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1802	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 295 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
30 May	1837	Opposite Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in May 2018

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 May	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1125 hours over Rumaysh.
	0900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1025 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1010	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over Rumaysh.
2 May	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1030 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1530 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1350 hours over Naqurah.
	1245	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2045 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1940	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2245 hours over Rumaysh.
	2035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2200 hours over Naqurah.
3 May	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1815 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1230	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	1255	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
4 May	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1730 hours over Yarun.
	0900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1030 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
5 May	0130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1505 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1140 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1335	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over the all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1445 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2110 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1810	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1925 hours over Rumaysh.
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0035 hours over Naqurah.
6 May	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1140 hours over Kafr Killa.
7 May	1555	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1635 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1640 hours over Aytarun.
	1720	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Shuf, the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1910 hours over Kafr Killa.
8 May	1020	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1240 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1255	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Shuba. They circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf and the South before leaving at 1405 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2035	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa, the Shuf and the South before leaving at 2145 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2320	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over the Shuf, the Western Bekaa, the South and the sea between Shikka and the South. They left at 0030 hours on 9 May over the sea west of Naqurah.
9 May	0215	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over the sea between Shikka and the South before leaving at 0245 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1100 hours over Rumaysh.
	2020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2115 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
10 May	0220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0220 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah and proceeding as far as Nabatiyah. They left at 0315 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1650 hours over Rumaysh.
	1030	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1600	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1645 hours over Rumaysh.
	1855	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2030 hours over the Shab'a Farms.
11 May	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Marj Uyun before leaving at 1500 hours over Yarun.
	1240	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1355 hours over Kafr Killa.
12 May	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1050 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2110 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
13 May	0925	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Rumaysh.
	1700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the Shab'a Farms. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2320 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 2300 hours over Rumaysh.
14 May	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0635 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1045 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1235	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1320 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 2050 hours over Rumaysh.
15 May	0550	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2010 hours over Rumaysh.
	0940	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1115 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
16 May	0910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the North before leaving at 2210 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1115	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1235 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1415	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1855 hours over Naqurah.
	1905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Sidon and the South before leaving at 2250 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Kafr Killa.
17 May	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1650 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0635	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1535 hours over Naqurah.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Ba'abda, Jubayl, Kisrawan, the Shuf and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1635 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over Batrun and the South before leaving at 1410 hours over Rumaysh.
	1845	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 0220 hours on 18 May over Aytarun.
	1955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Sa'diyat and Naqurah before leaving at 0110 hours on 18 March over the sea west of Naqurah.
18 May	0040	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the sea west of Sa'diyat and Naqurah before leaving at 0255 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1200	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1600	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
19 May	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1030 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1700 hours over Rumaysh.
	1730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2200 hours over Kafr Killa.
20 May	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1520 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Naqurah.
	1755	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1845 hours over Rumaysh.
21 May	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Zahlah, Ba'abda and Matn before leaving at 1410 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1100	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Yarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 2330 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Akkar, the North and Hirmil before leaving at 0145 hours on 22 May over Alma al-Sha'b.
22 May	0215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over Akkar before leaving at 0715 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1300	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1445 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0430 hours on 23 May over Rumaysh.
23 May	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1545 hours over Naqurah.
	1430	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1720 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1500	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled between Shikka and the South before leaving at 1615 hours over Naqurah.
	1625	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the North before leaving at 2015 hours over Rumaysh.
	2100	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the sea between Sidon and Naqurah before leaving at 2210 hours over Rumaysh.
24 May	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1035 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the North before leaving at 1700 hours over Naqurah.
	0820	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1900 hours over Rumaysh.
	1140	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Zahlah, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1940 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1450	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1615 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	2045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2130 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	2110	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0700 hours on 25 May over Rumaysh.
25 May	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1440 hours over the sea off Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	2220	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 0130 hours on 26 May over Aytarun.
26 May	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2335 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1015	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Alayh, the Shuf and Bisharri before disappearing from radar screens at 1325 hours over Bisharri.
27 May	1135	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Shuba. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2115 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1220	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1345 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1300	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 2025 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
28 May	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering from within occupied Palestinian territory at the Jubiyah position. It flew in a circle over the Lebanese Army position of Minarah before leaving at 0740 hours towards Shaykh Abbad, in occupied territory.
	1735	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Sidon. It circled over the South before leaving at 1945 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
30 May	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa, Riyaq, Baalbek and Akkar before leaving at 1940 hours over Yarun.
	2055	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2310 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2130	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. They circled over Jubayl and the South before leaving at 2210 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
31 May	1900	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over Shikka and the South before leaving at 2100 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 2125 hours over Kafr Killa.

United Nations S/2018/707

Security Council

Distr.: General
18 July 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 16 July 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period from 14 to 16 July 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) D. **Polyanskiy**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-11929 (E) 200718 200718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 16 July 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (14 July 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: one in Aleppo, one in Idlib and one in Ladhiqiyah.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,865 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,788.56 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 10 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 85,812 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (15 July 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported five incidents of gunfire: three in Aleppo Governorate and two in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation in Busra al-Sham, Dar'a Governorate: 1,000 food parcels with a total weight of over 4.3 tons were delivered.

In total, 1,866 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,792.86 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 10 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 85,832 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (16 July 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported two incidents of gunfire: one in Aleppo Governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation in Salihiyah, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate: 650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons in humanitarian assistance were delivered.

In total, 1,867 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,795.66 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to seven residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 85,829 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.



United Nations S/2018/708

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2018

Original: English

Credentials of the representative of Côte d'Ivoire on the Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 3 July 2018 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Côte d'Ivoire stating that Mr. Léon Houadja Adom Kacou has been appointed representative of Côte d'Ivoire on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

18-11865 (E) 180718

Please recycle

United Nations S/2018/709

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 July 2018

Original: English

Credentials of the alternate representative of the United States of America on the Security Council

Report of the Secretary-General

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 13 July 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations stating that Mr. Rodney Hunter has been appointed alternate representative of the United States of America on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

18-11873 (E) 180718

Please recycle